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I. Introduction
The Refugee Act of 1980 was a major reform and a giant step
forward in our ability to meet the resettlement needs of refugees.
... There is no need to review this history again; instead we
should focus on some of the refugee and asylum issues we will
face in these areas as we attempt to implement the Refugee Act
in the years ahead .... There is no question that [the] Refugee
Act will form the basis for our refugee policies and programs for
many years to come.
-U.S. Senator Edward M. Kennedy'
Peter H. Schuck, Simeon E. Baldwin Professor at Yale Law
School, compiled his previously published works on various
features of immigration law and policy in his new book entitled,
Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens: Essays on Immigration and
Citizenship.2 This comprehensive tract serves as an informative
Edward M. Kennedy, Foreword, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 6 (1981).
2 PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON
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source for sophisticated and engaging analysis and discussions of
important contemporary policy issues. Professor Schuck's book
contains an exhaustive history of state and federal immigration
laws that forbade newcomers on the basis of race, ideology, and
class. He should be commended for his in-depth research, which
provides an understanding of the relationship between
immigration law and foreign policy.
Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens distinguishes itself from
other immigration work through its timeliness and inclusiveness in
scope. For instance, the front cover of the book features a
photograph of young immigrant Hmong children in an elementary
classroom. Unlike most recent publications covering immigration,
Schuck moves beyond the trite "whites versus browns" and
"blacks versus browns" normative mode of analysis to address
issues affecting Asian immigrants, and in turn, to what most of
this country has seemed to have forgotten, or to have taken for
granted-the Refugee Act of 1980.' The Act has been overlooked
by mainstream scholars, who seem more interested in citing to the
Act only for its perfunctory purpose: to function as historical
background for their analyses of more recent immigration
legislation.
This article discusses Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens in
relation to a reexamination of the Refugee Act of 1980. Using as a
basis Professor Schuck's preliminary background research and
normative understanding of the Refugee Act, especially Chapter
13, entitled "Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal," this
article examines the conflicting viewpoints concerning the
meaning of the Refugee Act of 1980. In the process, this essay
also illustrates how the Asian refugee and immigrant experience
can contribute to the jurisprudence of race. The discussion
implicitly provides an important lesson: the inclusion of Asian
Americans in conversations about immigration and race expands
the traditional bipolar analytical framework of race relations and
racial hegemony.4
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP (1998).
3 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (1980).
4 See, e.g., Harvey Gee, A Class-Based Remedy: A Book Review of The Remedy:
Class, Race, and Affirmative Action by Richard D. Kahlenberg, 43 How. L.J. 273 (2000)
(describing the economic effects of affirmative action on Asian Americans); Harvey
Gee, Race, American Values, and Colorblind Justice, 5 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 121
2001]
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This article consists of seven sections. Part II summarizes the
descriptive sections of Schuck's volume discussing the history of
the United States immigration system by focusing on its laws and
policies as well as its effects on American society.' Part III
explores the popular, and I would argue mistaken, understanding
of the design of the Refugee Act of 1980.6 This section examines
the legislative history of the Act, and makes the argument that the
Act was not passed solely for humanitarian reasons, but also for
the purpose of limiting the number of Vietnamese refugees
coming into this country. Part IV explores the history of nativism
and its modem era resurrection.7 It also draws a direct relationship
between nativism and the Refugee Act. Part V reexamines the
historical events immediately following the end of the Vietnam
War and creates and develops the historical context in which the
Act is best understood.8 Part VI applies a Critical Race Theory
approach to the Act to show Congress actually passed the Act to
reduce the flow of refugees coming from Vietnam.9 This section
specifically focuses on the legislative history of the Act to show
that this legislation was anti-Asian at its core. Part VII concludes
with the proposition that the Refugee Act, known and often lauded
as a great law for creating asylum, remains misunderstood by
many commentators and by the general public.'
(2000) (book review) (illustrating how Asian Americans and Latinos are situated in the
affirmative action context); Harvey Gee, Beyond Black and White: Selected Writings by
Asian Americans Within the Critical Race Theory Movement, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 759
(1999) (discussing the contribution of Asian Americans to Critical Race Theory); Harvey
Gee, Race, Rights, and the Asian American Experience: A Review Essay, 13 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 635 (1999) (book review) (analyzing race and racism from an Asian
American perspective); Harvey Gee, Asian Americans, the Law, and Illegal Immigration
in Post-Civil Rights America: A Review of Three Books, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 71
(1999) [hereinafter Asian Americans, the Law, and Illegal Immigration]; Harvey Gee,
Comment, Changing Landscapes: The Need for Asian Americans to be Included in the
Affirmative Action Debate, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 621 (1997) [hereinafter Changing
Landscapes] (arguing that Asian Americans should be included in affirmative action
programs); Harvey Gee, The Other Minority: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action,
ASIAN WEEK, Mar. 7, 1997, at 5.
5 See infra notes 12-61 and supporting text.
6 See infra notes 62-80 and supporting text.
7 See infra notes 81-180 and supporting text.
8 See infra notes 181-324 and supporting text.
9 See infra notes 325-544 and supporting text.
10 See infra note 545 and supporting text.
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U. Immigration, Policymaking, and the Law
A. Citizenship and Community: The Racial and Cultural
Politics of Belonging and the Plenary Power Doctrine and
Judicial Review
Professor Schuck makes many persuasive points throughout
his book. He suggests that "[i]mmigration law often implicates the
nation's basic foreign policy objectives, a circumstance that has
sometimes provoked the Supreme Court, even in non-immigration
contexts, to be less scrupulous in safeguarding constitutional
values and more deferential to the other branches of
government."" Schuck extends this important point in his
intriguing critique of the plenary power doctrine."2 Schuck finds
"no textual warrant for it in the Constitution ... and the structural
and policy justifications that have been used to support it, such as
the need for a single voice in foreign affairs, are either weak or
over-broad."' 3 According to Professor Schuck, the differences
between citizens and aliens make the heightened judicial scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
" SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 19.
12 See id. at 195-97; see also Maureen Callahan VanderMay, The Misunderstood
Origins of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 147, 165 (1999)
(criticizing the Supreme Court decisions and analyses that have established the plenary
power doctrine and concluding that they provide little support for the concept of plenary
power); Meredith K. Olafson, Note, The Concept of Limited Sovereignty and the
Immigration Law Plenary Power, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 433, 433 (1999) (arguing that
"the plenary power doctrine rests on a conception of absolute state sovereignty that no
longer accords with United States constitutional norms and public international law");
Collin O'Connor Udell, Miller v. Albright: Plenary Power, Equal Protection, and the
Rights of an Alien Love Child, 12 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 621, 621-22 (1998).
Historically, the Court has held that Congress' power to exclude aliens is
plenary, "inherent in sovereignty," and exclusive. Under the plenary power
doctrine, courts have accorded statutes concerning Congress' exclusion power a
very deferential standard of review. Although the exclusion power was not
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, the Court has denominated it a
sovereign power delegated to Congress by the Constitution.
Id. Nicholas J. Johnson, Plenary Power and Constitutional Outcasts: Federal Power,
Critical Race Theory, and the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, 57 OHIO ST. L.J.
1555, 1558 (1996) (claiming that "plenary power constitutionalism is arguably as great a
danger to American minorities as a more formalist, power-limiting constitutionalism that
some consider the domain of contemporary political conservatives").
13 SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 195-96.
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which is the main alternative doctrinal constraint on state alienage
discrimination, difficult to apply."
Professor Schuck provides a discussion of the need for
providing legal protections to aliens. For example, he notes the
strong belief of some immigration scholars who argue that the
federal government's broad power over aliens should be subject to
constitutional limitations." But here, Professor Schuck's
arguments do not go far enough.'6
Law Professor Frank Wu provides a more meaningful analysis.
According to Professor Wu, the Supreme Court should abolish the
archaic doctrine of plenary power and apply the same standard of
review to immigration laws that it applies to all other laws.'7 Wu
argues that allowing federal immigration laws to be reviewed
under strict scrutiny would protect immigrants from
discriminatory laws.'" Strict scrutiny requires the government to
present a compelling interest substantially related to the
discriminatory classification, and then to utilize the least
restrictive means available to accomplish that goal.'9 Wu contends
that while the Supreme Court has labeled immigrant status a
"suspect class" in the context of state laws, the Court has resisted
affording immigrants protection from federal laws because of its
interpretation of the plenary power doctrine." The important
14 Id. at 196.
15 Id.
16 Cf. Noah M.J. Pickus, To Make Natural: Creating Citizens for the Twenty-First
Century, in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 114 (Noah
M.J. Pickus ed., 1998) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP] (contending that a
more substantive naturalization process is necessary to form a "single complex sense of
constitutional identity ... to integrate our allegiances to the multiple communities to
which we belong"). Schuck offers no realistic recommendations in his analysis. On the
other hand, Pickus provides policy alternatives that are pragmatic in nature and are
necessary for a more meaningful naturalization and asylum process. Id.
'7 Frank H. Wu, The Limits of Borders, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 35, 35 (1996). A
long line of Supreme Court precedents has made clear that, regarding immigration,
Congress may do what would be forbidden elsewhere. E.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,
799-800 (1977) (upholding immigration statute that discriminated on basis of gender and
legitimacy in a manner that concededly is not "carefully tuned to alternative
considerations" as applied to citizens).
18 Wu, supra note 17, at 48-49.
'9 See id.
20 Id.; see also Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative
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lesson, Wu says, is that "[t]he realities of immigration policy
should shape our civil rights jurisprudence, but because
immigration law has been exempted from traditional constitutional
review, it has not had an effect on legal doctrine.
21
Professor Schuck devotes a great deal of his book to the
relationship between citizenship and community. He seems
especially concerned with the question of how aliens are to be
treated in a federal system in which the national government
possesses primary responsibility for regulating aliens, "while the
states, which sometimes have fiscal and political incentives to
discriminate against them, possess some degree of policy
autonomy, especially in a devolutionary era. 22
In his writing, Professor Schuck makes clear his strong belief
that racism no longer plays a crucial role in immigration law.23
However, he also concedes that immigration does shape a number
Apology and Prediction for Our Strange But Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration
Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 260 (2000) (stating that even if equal protection
principles were applied to the national government under the law at the time that the
Supreme Court upheld various portions of the Chinese Exclusion Act, equal protection
was not understood then as requiring identical treatment of different races).
For more than a century, immigration law has been haunted by the so-called
plenary power doctrine, a Court-crafted rule of extreme judicial deference to
congressional and executive exercises of the immigration power. The doctrine
has never been applied to all cases involving aliens. The Court has made clear
that outside the immigration and naturalization context, immigrants (even
unauthorized migrants) enjoy most of the constitutional rights afforded citizens;
and state regulations that discriminate on the basis of alienage (other than those
involving political rights) will be strictly scrutinized.
Id. Cronelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary
Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1999 Sup.
CT. REV. 1, 32 (1999).
21 Frank H. Wu, Shaping the Rules for Belonging: Immigration and Affirmative
Action Can Work Together, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 9, 1996, at 25.
22 See SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 196. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Citizenship, in
IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE
UNITED STATES 319-22 (Juan F. Pera ed., 1997) [hereinafter IMMIGRANTS OUT!]
(examining the notion of citizenship, consent, and belonging to a national community);
Charles R. Kessler, The Promise of American Citizenship, in IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP, supra note 16, at 15-21 (discussing the importance of immigration and
naturalization to the Founding Fathers). Cf. ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN
AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE 28 (1999) (discussing immigration in its
larger context as a window into the political economies of race and nativistic racism).
23 SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 327.
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of racially charged policy questions, such as the future level and
composition of the population, affirmative action, multicultural
education, and legislative districting.24 Perhaps the strongest
indications of Schuck's political ideology and his views on the
immigration debate are found in a chapter entitled "Consensual
Citizenship,"2 which is an abbreviated version of his coauthored
book, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the American
Polity.26 In this section, Schuck makes the controversial proposal
that the children of illegal aliens should not, as a matter of
constitutional right, be American citizens.27 His proposal that the
traditional basis for citizenship be reexamined runs directly against
the 1898 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Wong Kim
Ark,28 holding that the children of Chinese legally present in the
United States were automatically American citizens, provided that
the children were born on American soil.
2 9
Law Professor and prominent Critical Race Theorist Richard
Delgado disagrees with Peter Schuck's call for national autonomy
and his view that a nation ought to have unlimited discretion in
deciding whom it shall admit." Delgado finds especially
24 Id. at 327-28.
25 Id. at 207.
26 PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT:
ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985). This book has received a great deal of
criticism from Critical Race Theorists who argue that Schuck completely rejects any
possibility of racial animus affecting immigration politics. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note
22, at 318 (arguing that Schuck underestimates the powerful obstacle that race may pose
in immigration politics); Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the Search for Political
Community Among 'We the People,' 76 OR. L. Rav. 233 (1997) (discussing the history
of citizenship and naturalization in a racial context). But see Kevin R. Johnson, Racial
Hierarchy, Asian Americans and Latinos as "Foreigners," and Social Change: Is Law
the Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REv. 348 (1997) (arguing that "race influences the debate
about national identity in the modern United States").
27 SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 212-13. But see Hiroshi Motomura, Alienage
Classification in a Nation of Immigrants: Three Models of "Permanent" Residence, in
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 16, at 199-202 (offering a more textual
understanding of alienage classifications than the account that prevails in public policy
and constitutional law analysis).
28 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
29 Id. at 694. Perhaps Schuck would find solace in knowing that Chief Justice
Fuller held similar views, as expressed in his dissenting opinion that American-born
Chinese were not citizens of the United States. See id. (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
30 Delgado, supra note 22, at 321.
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troublesome Schuck's conviction that communities should be able
to determine their own membership." Interestingly, Delgado
suggests that:
The [Schuck] argument draws on the premises of
communitarism, a moderate-liberal school of jurisprudence that
sprang up in the 1980s, perhaps as an antidote to the unfettered
individualism of the early Reagan-Bush years. But the argument
struck a chord as well with conservatives, offering them a
principled argument for accomplishing what many of them
wanted to achieve-the promotion of an America-first
philosophy-but for a much less noble reason, namely a dislike
of foreigners and immigrants.32
Delgado claims that the Schuck vision of community is too ideal
because we live in a world that is shaped by racism, sexism, and
xenophobia that serves to perpetuate the racist past. In other
words, Delgado asserts that immigration policy is influenced by
racism and exclusionary practices.33
Schuck maneuvers around the question of race in his proposal
to eliminate birthright citizenship, an issue that is deeply entwined
with the significant modem racial issues of Mexican, Central
American, West Indian, and Asian immigrants in technical
violation of immigration laws. In his discussion, Schuck treats
the status of undocumented immigrants as unrelated to racial
questions, and only in passing does he acknowledge the ethnic
dimension when referring to the practice of blaming domestic
problems on recent immigrants.3" Apparently, only two
developments seem to cause Schuck uneasiness: the dramatic
increase in the number of undocumented aliens, and the
emergence of the American welfare state.36 These two factors
reinforce Schuck's belief that unless measures are taken to address
these trends, American society may become destabilized to its
detriment.
Schuck's views have drawn notable attention. Professor
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 214-16.
35 Id. at 213-14.
36 Id. at 215-16.
2001]
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Richard Delgado disfavors Schuck's argument that "if large
numbers of outsiders were free to settle, bringing with them new
values, languages, and patterns of behavior, they would in effect
have the right to force the nation to become something it is not."37
Delgado contends that this "state of affairs is inconsistent with the
idea of a community of self-defining citizens; any nation is free to
resist."38
Throughout Schuck's writing, there are allusions to
"controll[ing] our borders" and complaints about the highly visible
presence of "un-American communities."39 The direction of
complaints over "foreign" cultures prevalent in our communities is
exemplified by the efforts to make English the official language. ' °
If Schuck had his way, he would deny governmental benefits for
all non-citizens and impose any existing economic and social
burdens on them."
In proposing that birthright citizenship be abolished, Schuck
recognizes that this would create a group of aliens who are
permanent residents but are ineligible for citizenship. 2 He fails to
discuss how an earlier version of the status of aliens ineligible for
17 Delgado, supra note 22, at 321.
38 Id.
39 SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 214-18.
40 See Marcia Chambers, California Braces for Change with English as Official
Language, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1986, at A20; Lydia Chavez, Leaders Ready for Fight
Over English-Only Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1986, at A7; Robert Lindsey, Debates
Growing on Use of English, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1986, at Al.
41 See SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 215-16; see also Peter H. Schuck, The Re-
Evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 18 (1997).
In the United States the welfare state-especially the creation of entitlements to
support income, food stamps, medical care, and subsidized housing-expanded
rapidly during a brief period of time, at least when compared to the more
gradual, long-term evolution of European social support systems.... In contrast
to the historical pattern, immigration no longer ebbed and flowed with the
business cycle-presumably because of the growth of the social safety net.
Immigration increasingly pitted citizens and aliens against one another as they
competed for scarce public resources.
Id.
42 Cf. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 26, at 99 (asserting that it is "morally perverse"
to reward those who break the immigration laws with the benefits of citizenship). Illegal
aliens are much less deserving of citizenship than their legal competitors for limited
available services. Id. at 99, 114.
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citizenship was the basis of racially discriminatory actions by both
the state and federal government. Similarly, Schuck's thesis
effectively sidesteps the issue of the xenophobic aspects of these
complaints against immigrants as a revival of old-fashioned
nativism. This ignores the simple fact that as a matter of history
and law, racial considerations have always been deeply implicated
in the debates over immigration and citizenship and cannot and
should not be summarily dismissed.
Professor Schuck downplays the influence of race in
immigration law policymaking throughout his analysis. His
discussion of only "illegal" immigrants and his refusal to
acknowledge the racial link to foreignness serve to undermine the
practicality of his project. Neil Gotanda, a strong critic of
Schuck's work on citizenship, remarks of Schuck's version of
mutual consent to citizenship between the governed and the
government:
As applied to citizenship, consensual principles would mean that
Congress would determine preconditions for citizenship such as
residency, which an individual could either accept or reject.
However, under [Schuck' s] consensual approach, the democratic
majority acting through Congress would set the terms for
immigration as a whole. But a fully developed consensual
citizenship, combined with majoritarian democratic principles,
would raise the possibility of majority discrimination against an
unpopular minority.43
Schuck's analytical framework is severely weakened when one
considers the category of racial jurisprudence that affects non-
black racial minorities, primarily Latinos, Asians, and Arab
Americans. These "other" non-whites face a recurrent form of
racism because they possess a dimension of "foreignness."
According to Neil Gotanda, "the popular understandings of
'foreignness' suggest that the concept is now infused with a racial
character."" The internment of Japanese Americans during World
War II and its subsequent analysis by the Supreme Court under a
foreigner/alien paradigm instead of a black/white equal protection
framework illustrates this point.45
41 Gotanda, supra note 26, at 240.
44 Id. at 253.
45 See Frank H. Wu, The Truth at the Heart of Internment, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 1998,
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In a quartet of cases," the most famous of which is Korematsu
v. United States,7 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Japanese American internment. By doing so, the Court
condoned racist attitudes and the subversion of the civil liberties of
Japanese Americans. 8 Angelo Ancheta observes that "[t]he most
at 11 (arguing that racism against people of Asian descent led to the internment of
Japanese Americans during World War II, and that the Japanese were considered
outsiders who could not assimilate because of their race). According to Wu, "[e]ven
today, decisions about who is allowed to immigrate legally and who is entitled to
become a citizen depend on race. It's time to throw out these distinctions, once and for
all." Id.; see also Harry H.L. Kitano & Mitchell Maki, The Passage of Redress: The
Proper Alignment Model, 7 ASIAN AM. POL'Y REV. 55, 59 (1998).
No matter how hard [the Nisei, or second generation Japanese Americans] tried
to become "American," they faced rejection from the mainstream community
and their parents, who believed they were becoming "too American" too fast.
An additional factor, which continues to the present day, was the inability of the
American society to differentiate between Japanese Americans and the actions
of Japan. This was an important factor in the wartime incarceration, when the
prevailing thought was that since they all looked alike, they must be alike.
Id.
46 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (affirming that the restriction
on individuals of Japanese ancestry at certain addresses remain in their residences
between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. was within the constitutional powers of the Executive,
and holding that said restriction did not unconstitutionally discriminate between citizens
of Japanese ancestry and citizens of other ancestries); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S.
115, 115-117 (1943) (citing Hirabayashi and stating that the curfew order was valid
when applied to citizens, as well as sustaining the conviction of American-born
individuals of Japanese ancestry); Exparte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 284, 304 (1944)
(citing Hirabayashi and ordering an unconditional release by the War Relocation
Authority); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
47 323 U.S. at 214.
48 Bill Ong Hing, Asian Americans and Present U.S. Immigration Policies: A
Legacy of Asian Exclusion, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1107 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992). "The incarceration of
110,000 Japanese Americans during World War II solely based on their ancestry rather
than on proven culpability or sabotage, reaffirmed the government's view that the curb
on rights based on ancestry and ethnicity was not only necessary but lawful." Id.; see
also Reggie Oh & Frank Wu, The Evolution of Race and the Law: The Supreme Court
Moves From Approving Internment of Japanese Americans to Disapproving Affirmative
Action for African Americans, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 165, 165 (1996) (reporting that
Korematsu is the only case of racial classification that has survived the Court's strict
scrutiny analysis; noting that Korematsu remains the benchmark for the strict scrutiny
standard); Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited-Correcting the Injustice of
Extraordinary Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better
Accommodation of National Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 1, 1 (1986) (asserting that by "[1]ooking beyond the record, the Court in effect took
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disturbing irony of the Korematsu decision lies in the Court's
skirting of the basic racial issues after it established an exacting
standard for governmental classifications based on race."49
According to Ancheta:
[t]he Court made no inquiry into the overinclusiveness of
excluding loyal citizens and permanent residents from the West
Coast, nor did the Court make an inquiry into the
underinclusiveness of a program that targeted people of
Japanese ancestry . . . . By granting lip service to its newly
established principle of strict scrutiny, the Court racialized
Japanese Americans as enemy aliens. °
Juan Pera shares Ancheta's disdain for the lack of judicial
integrity during World War II. He suggests that "the
discriminatory treatment of Japanese Americans because of their
race becomes very clear by comparing their treatment with that of
German and Italian citizens and aliens who might have posed
similar threats of sabotage during World War II.' Pera argues
that:
only German and Italian aliens were burdened by the curfew and
exclusion orders, and those excluded were permitted to return
home promptly, unlike the Japanese. It is also clear that the
degree of threat presented by Japanese citizens and aliens were
knowingly exaggerated; there was never any significant military
judicial notice of the government's preferred general conclusions concerning both racial
stereotypes and the dangers of espionage and sabotage which were allegedly posed by
West Coast Japanese Americans"). Cf. Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law
and Enforcement: A Response to Is There A Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 289, 297 (2000) (arguing that the profound difference between the actual treatment
of citizens and "aliens" should not be minimized).
49 ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHT, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 71
(1998).
50 Id.; see also Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian Americans and
Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 255 (1995) (questioning the
Supreme Court ruling in the Korematsu internment case, which was presented by the
Court as not concerning race, although the internment applied only to Japanese
Americans as a single racial group). Cf. Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian
Americans and Latinos as "Foreigners, " and Social Change: Is Law the Way to Go?, 76
OR. L. REv. 347, 354 (1997) (discussing the treatment of Asians and Asian Americans as
perpetual foreigners despite their presence in the United States for generations).
51 Juan F. Pera, "Am I an American or Not?": Reflections on Citizenship,
Americanization, and Race, in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 16, at 58.
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threat posed by persons of Japanese ancestry. 2
This anti-Japanese fervor permeated even the high levels of
government. According to Perea:
the Justice Department's lawyers, in their briefs and
representations to the Supreme Court, suppressed evidence that
showed that responsible military authorities, including members
of the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence, felt that
evacuation and detention of all persons of Japanese ancestry
were unnecessary and that individualized determinations of
loyalty were both possible and preferable to mass, race-based
incarceration. 3
B. Sharing the Burden of Refugees
In Chapter 13, entitled "Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest
Proposal," Schuck reaffirms the failings of present policy and
insists that improvements need to be made to ensure refugee
protection." In this section, Schuck argues that the international
refugee problem could be better addressed by having wealthier
industrialized countries, such as Germany or Japan, either share
the responsibility of receiving refugees, or compensate other
countries that are reasonably safe but less desirable as migration
destinations, for accepting a disproportionate number of refugees.5
Schuck then discusses the burdens that massive refugee flows
impose on states. Within this context, he argues that: (1) "the
emerging state responses to the burdens are jeopardizing the
viability of any meaningful regime of internal human rights
protection"; (2) a realistic solution to this problem must ease these
burdens in exchange for obligations likely to be accepted and
implemented by states; and (3) these obligations must be
distributed widely and equitably among states over time. 6
Schuck ultimately desires to salvage a meaningful human
rights regime. Though Schuck doubts that his proposed provisions
will be adopted given the practical realities of refugee crises and
international politics, he offers four broad strategies for improving
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 282.
55 Id. at 283.
56 Id.
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refugee protections: (1) the elimination of "the root causes of
refugee flows;"57 (2) the "prompt repatriation of refugees;"58 (3) the
"temporary protection of refugees," 59 and (4) the "permanent
resettlement of refugees in third world countries."'o This chapter is
clearly the thrust of his analysis, as evidenced by its extremely
detailed discussions and his creative attempt to wrestle the
Gordian knot of refugee law.
At any rate, Schuck is correct in his self-evaluation of his
proposals. As a realist, he states, "[like many promises, its hopes
might not be fully realized, but even so it could hardly leave
refugees worse off than they are now. In view of both the
deplorable status quo and the potential for human rights gains, can
we afford not to try?"6'
As a major contribution to immigration law literature, Citizens,
Strangers, and In-Betweens is both academic and practical. The
book's theoretical coverage of immigration is tremendous, as is
Schuck's intellectual curiosity. The volume is also practical in the
sense that Schuck provides pragmatic policy recommendations
focusing on procedure and structure. However, as with all works
in progress, Schuck's analysis needs to be extended to gain a
broader and more complete understanding of how race influences
immigration and refugee policy.
HI. Reinterpreting Old Laws with New Perspectives
This author has strong contentions with certain technical points
in Schuck's research. More specifically, the author of this article
disagrees with two mistaken assumptions. First, in his analysis of
the Immigration Act of 1965, Schuck errs in suggesting that
Congress and the Johnson Administration predicted that few non-
Europeans, especially Asians, would come to the United States.62
Many commentators, including Schuck, have come to embrace the
belief that when Congress passed the 1965 Act it had a conscious
belief that white immigrants would continue to dominate the
57 Id. at 285.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 325.
62 Id. at 12.
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immigrant stream.63 Those who share Schuck's view believe that
Congress offered legal equality because Congress believed that
non-white immigrants would not take advantage of immigration
opportunities.' As John Miller notes, "[i]f Congress had known in
1965 that its reforms would open the door to more than 18 million
immigrants over the next three decades-about one-third of them
from Asia-they may not have passed the new law. They were just
plain wrong about what the bill would bring. 65 Schuck claims that
"[t]he 1965 reform had dramatically and unexpectedly shifted the
source-country pattern toward high-volume Asian and Hispanic
Flows. ' 6  In reality, according to Law Professor Gabriel Chin,
Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1965 with the opposite
assumption.67 Professor Chin makes the argument that the 1965
Immigration Act's revolutionary feature was its race-neutrality.68 It
was the first time since the United States began regulating
immigration that race was not a factor.69 Chin's thesis has made a
major contribution to the immigration law literature because it
63 See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law : A
New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REv. 273, 277
(1996); see also Hyung-chan Kim, American Naturalization and Immigration Policy:
Asian American Perspective, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND CONGRESS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 2 (Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1996) [hereinafter ASIAN AMERICANS AND CONGRESS]
(stating that "it is important, albeit painful, for us to recognize that American
immigration and naturalization policy has been extremely discriminatory against non-
white people until 1965"); HARRY H.L. KITANO & ROGER DANIEL, ASIAN AMERICANS:
EMERGING MINORITIES 161 (1988) (asserting that discriminatory laws against Asian
immigrants were an important part of U.S. national policy until the Immigration Act of
1965). But see JOHN J. MILLER, THE UNMAKING OF AMERICANS: How
MULTICULTURALISM HAS UNDERMINED THE ASSIMILATION ETHIC 104 (1998) (arguing
that "[n]obody expected that the [Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965] would
radically alter immigration patterns").
64 See SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 12; see also PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION:
COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION DISASTER 188 (1995) (stating that
"according to the 1965 Bill's advocates, the U.S. ethnic balance would not be altered at
all").
65 MILLER, supra note 63, at 104. For a more generalized review of Miller's
volume, see Harvey Gee, The Book Adds Nothing to Immigration Debate, S.F. DAILY J.,
Sept, 26, 2000, at 6 (reviewing MILLER, supra note 63).
66 SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 99.
67 Chin, supra note 63, at 273.
68 Id. at 297.
69 Id.
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sheds light on important facts that were previously overlooked by
mainstream scholars. Chin's methodology was comprised largely
of a close reading of the Act itself, combined with an
understanding of the sociopolitical context for its passage and
sound legal reasoning.
Second, Schuck sides with many commentators in presenting
the Refugee Act of 198070 as law crafted by a systematic legal
structure for controlling refugee admissions and adjudicating
refugees and asylum claims in the idea and spirit of humanitarian
admissions and equality." Unfortunately, Schuck is only partially
correct in his understanding of the Act.
Consistent with this dominant image, Schuck reports that
Congress implemented the Refugee Act of 1980 in response to
increased immigration in the 1980s, which created enormous
pressures for legal change. 2 The enactment of the Refugee Act of
1980 created a legislative basis for asylum status and the necessary
systematic basis for its determination. 3 His immediate perception
is the one shared by the general public and mainstream academics.
In his view, "[t]he Refugee Act... regularized refugee and
asylum criteria and procedures in the interest of equal treatment
while preserving discretion to favor some countries and regions
over others."74 According to Schuck, this was just one of several
fundamental changes in American and administrative law that
shifted immigration law away from its exclusionary history and
toward a more pro-alien focus. 5
Schuck's views of refugee asylum law, however, are far from
complete, if not entirely wrong. Schuck's perceptions of the
Indochinese7 6 refugee crisis in relationship to the passage of the
Refugee Act of 1980 and the Comprehensive Plan of Action
resettlement program, which he believes were both successful,77
70 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1159 (1982).
71 SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 13.
72 Id. at 82.
73 Id. at 44.
74 Id. at 12.
71 Id. at 83.
76 The term Indochinese will be used in this article to refer collectively to refugees
from the countries of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
77 SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 291.
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are particularly troubling. In addition to praising the Refugee Act
of 1980 as a high water mark in the name of worldwide
humanitarianism, Schuck seems to be have been swept up in his
belief and enthusiasm that the United States acted only upon its
own commitment of protecting its wartime allies and in providing
what he terms a "noncommunist alternative to the peoples of
Indochina."" According to Schuck, "[imn addition to providing
humanitarian assistance, the U.S. interest was served by a system
that accorded presumptive refugee status to all those fleeing the
southeast Asian communist regimes. The resettlement program
also supported the conventional immigration policy goals of
resettlement countries."" Similarly, Schuck reifies the efforts on
behalf of the United Nations working in conjunction with the
leadership of the United States. For example, Schuck reports that:
[F]rom 1979 until 1989, over 1.7 million Indochinese refugees
were resettled under the framework laid out at the 1979
conference, and over 150,000 left through the ODP [Orderly
Departure Program]. . . . [T]he Indochinese resettlement
program demonstrates . . . the leadership of the United States
and UNCHR. UNCHR coordinated international discussions,
established refugee camps and holding centers, channeled funds
to care for the refugees, and monitored the implementation of
the resettlement programs. The United States, the largest
resettlement country, shouldered a significant share of the costs.
The sheer number of cooperating countries reflected, at least in
part, U.S. leadership. Had the United States and UNCHR not
borne the brunt of the resettlement and organizational burdens,
the international consensus might have unraveled."0
Throughout his book, Professor Schuck uses a great deal of
laudatory words to underscore what he believes was sound public
policy behind the resettlement efforts following the Indochinese
refugee crisis. In this author's view, his beliefs are partly
disingenuous, if not wholly misguided. Schuck seems to gloss
over the reality that the resettlement programs for the Vietnamese
refugees were a failure. A closer examination of the facts supports
this author's contention.
11 Id. (quoting Astri Suhrke, Indochinese Refugees: The Law and Politics of First
Asylum, in REFUGEES AND WORLD POLITICS 136, 145 (Elizabeth G. Ferris ed., 1985)).
79 Id.
80 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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IV. The Refugee Act of 1980
We have sent tens of thousands of American soldiers to Vietnam
to defend the people of that country because we believed that as
free people they are worthy of our support. But if the finest
citizen of Vietnam wanted to come and live in America today,
he would have to wait for many years.
-U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy.8
This nation has committed itself to the defense of the
independence of South Vietnam. Yet the quota for that country
of 15 million is exactly 100. Apparently we are willing to risk a
major war for the right of the Vietnamese people to live in
freedom at the same time our quota system makes it clear that
we do not want very great numbers of them to live with us.
-U.S. Representative John Lindsay82
This examination of the Refugee Act of 1980 is timely, given
the fact that last spring marked its twentieth anniversary, and that
it has been misunderstood since its passage. What was the real
purpose behind the Act? Many immigration scholars have lauded
the Act as a great accomplishment in immigration law. For
instance, immigration scholars Deborah Anker and Michael
Posner wrote in an article outlining the legislative history of the
Refugee Act that it reflects the evolution of a consensus for the
humanitarian, nondiscriminatory policy, and that it created
mechanisms to resolve the continual friction between the
Executive and Congress over the control and standards for refugee
admissions.83 They conclude by stating, "[w]e believe that the
Refugee Act provides a sound and practical legislative base from
which a successful refugee policy can be developed. Accordingly,
we do not recommend nor do we believe that it would be wise to
modify the Refugee Act as enacted in 1980."84
Likewise, restrictionists have also misunderstood the Act and
8' 111 CONG. REc. 24, 777 (1965).
82 111 CONG. REc. 21, 769 (1965).
83 Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative
History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 9, 12 (1981).
84 Id.
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refugee policy. For example, in his recently published anti-
immigrant polemic, The Unmaking of Americans: How
Multiculturalism Has Undermined the Assimilation Ethic,85 John
Miller, a political reporter for the National Review and former
vice-president of the Center for Equal Opportunity, renews the
issue of national identity by stating that, due to the increased
immigration of people who do not want to be Americans, the
United States is losing its national purpose.86 Miller professes that
"[r]efugee policy is driven almost entirely by humanitarian
concerns and the refugees themselves have not always had much
time for their departure" from their native country.87
These sentiments have since become the standard and
generally accepted view of the Refugee Act of 1980. But was it
really meant to serve a humanitarian end in granting asylum to
refugees, or was it passed to limit the number of Indochinese
refugees arriving in the United States? A close reading of the
legislative history of the Refugee Act reveals some support for the
popular perception held by many that Congress implemented the
Act to move the United States into accord with the obligation
imposed under international refugee law, which for the first time
created a general right to apply for asylum in the United States for
noncitizens fleeing political and related prosecution in their
homelands.88 Nevertheless, the more probable conclusion is that
the passage of the Act was designed to exclude the admission of
refugees from Southeast Asia.
85 MILLER, supra note 63.
86 Id. at 216.
87 Id.; see also Richard K. Preston, Asylm Adjudications: Do State Department
Advisory Opinions Violate Refugees' Rights and U.S. International Obligations?, 45
MD. L. REv. 91, 92 (1986) ("The passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 reaffirmed the
American tradition of embracing those who face prosecution at home.").
88 See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987) (stating that the
purpose of the Act "was to bring United States refugee law into conformance" with
Protocol.); 138 CONG. REc. S 152274, S 15275 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1992) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy) (describing Refugee Act's embodiment of nonrefoulement principle
contained in 1957 Convention and 1967 Protocol); H.R. REP. No. 608, at 1, 6, 17-18
(1979) (stating that the purpose of Refugee Act was to develop U.S. refugee policy
consistent with 1967 Protocol); David D. Jividen, Comment, Rediscovering the Burden
of Proof for Asylum and the Withholding of Deportation, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 943, 954
(1986) (explaining that Congress intended Act to be "construed consistently with 1967
Protocol").
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A. A Critical Theory of the Racial Animus Against the
Vietnamese and the "Political Relevance and Legal
Irrelevance of Race: "89 Applying the Critical Race Theory
Cultural Meaning Test
Immigration Law Professor Kevin Johnson notes that
"[t]hough the overtly racist views expressed about Asians seen in
the past are rarely found in modem mainstream discourse about
immigration, anti-Asian sentiment remains alive and well in the
United States. Increased Asian immigration since 1965 has
reinvigorated such sentiment."9 The Refugee Act of 1980 is an
example that bolsters his contention. Johnson argues that "[t]he
Refugee Act of 1980, often praised [as a generous and flexible
policy of] humanitarian admissions, was motivated in part by the
desire to end the Executive Branch's [liberal] ad hoc admission[s]
of sizeable numbers of refugees from Southeast Asia."9' Johnson
asserts that "[t]he law established numerical limits on refugee
admissions and generally restricted the power of the President to
admit refugees, with the hope of preventing future mass
migrations.""
Likewise, Bill Ong Hing, Law Professor at the University of
California at Berkeley and Executive Director of the Immigrant
Legal Resources Center, observes that, "[t]he unpredictable
numbers of Southeast Asian refugees provided the impetus for
reform and ultimately, the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act." 3
Even anti-immigration lobbying groups, such as Federation for
American Immigration Reform (FAIR), suggest that one of the
primary motivating factors behind the passage of the act was to
89 This metaphor is presented in an influential article on the racial aspects of
California's Proposition 187. See Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics,
Popular Democracy, and California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and
Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REv. 629 (1995).
90 Kevin R. Johnson, The New Nativism: Something New, Something Borrowed,
Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 22, at 174.
9' Id.; see also, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. H4501 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1980) (comments of
Rep. Rodino) (characterizing the law as "one of the most important pieces of
humanitarian legislation ever enacted").
92 Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A
"Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1134 (1998).
93 BILL ONG HING, To BE AN AMERICAN: CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE
RHETORIC OF ASSIMILATION 28 (1997).
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limit the admission of Indochinese refugees." According to FAIR,
Beginning with the fall of Vietnam and Cambodia in April 1975,
this five-year period saw the admission of more than 400,000
Indochinese refugees, [and] the enactment of major amendments
to the Immigration and Nationality Act in the form of the
Refugee Act of 1980.... [The] legislation was enacted in part in
response to Congress' increasing frustration with the difficulty
of dealing with the ongoing large-scale Indochinese refugee
flow under the existing ad hoc refugee admission and
resettlement mechanisms."
The Congressional efforts to limit the number of Indochinese
refugees has its roots in historical racism. To understand fully the
context in which the Refugee Act of 1980 was created and passed,
an understanding of the historic and contemporary dynamic
interrelationships of race, immigration, and asylum law must first
be established.
The primary reason why mainstream scholars have ignored the
racial aspects of the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 is because
a strictly legal analysis is historical and incomplete. A fuller
analysis would reveal the complex relationship that exists between
immigration and race. An alternative examination, employing new
analytical frameworks offered by the progressive Critical Race
Theory96 intellectual movement, allows the use of contextual
94 FAIR-U.S., Immigration History Refugees and the Refugee Act of 1980, at
http://www.fairus.org/html/03202603.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2001).
95 Id.
96 Critical Race Theory, in its purest form, is best understood as the antithesis
to the traditional belief in "color-blindness" . . . . Critical Race Theorists
postulate that because legislative bodies have historically utilized racial
classifications to discriminate against minorities and racial classifications in the
law have persisted-thus legitimizing the notion that individuals are defined by
their race-members of society can no longer think of themselves and others in
racial terms. As a result, Critical Race Theorists demand that the modem-day
legal system address the systematic effects that derive from the mode of "racial-
thinking."
Harvey Gee, Beyond Black and White: Selected Writings by Asian Americans Within the
Critical Race Theory Movement, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 759, 764-65 (1999).
For an overview of Critical Race Theory, see KIMBERLE CRENSHAW ET AL.,
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (1996);
KIMBERLE CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard
Delgado ed., 1995).
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sources to place the Refugee Act into its proper historical, social,
and economic context, which is necessary for a broader, more
accurate understanding of the Act as being anti-Vietnamese at its
core. Removing the Act from abstract legal analysis supports the
fact that racial identities are created and recreated to accommodate
the economic and political conditions of America97 and proves that
underlying the Act were nativistic sentiments motivated by racist
animosity against Indochinese refugees. The factors that combined
to lead to the passage of the Act include an ailing national
economy and the growing pains of an increasingly multicultural
and multiracial America. These considerations helped focus public
concern on the perceived burden that Vietnamese refugees
imposed on this country's economic and cultural health.
Professor Neil Gotanda theorizes that "[c]ongressional actions
carry within them overlapping, and even contradictory distinctions
about citizenship, ethnicity, border geography, and race."98
Gotanda terms the end product as "American Orientalism:"99
That concept includes as a crucial element a distinct
understanding of race-a socially constructed category linked to
physiognomy-applied to persons of Asian ancestry. In addition
to including notions of race, American Orientalism has
developed through a definition and redefinition of the Orient-a
cultural and ideological location related to, but distinct from,
geographical Asia. American Orientalism also includes a
complex re-working of Americans through the mechanisms of
ethnicity and the legal category of citizenship.1°°
Unlike earlier restrictionist laws in United States history,
contemporary immigration legislation affecting persons of Asian
97 LISA LOWE, IMMIGRANT ACTS: ON ASIAN AMERICAN CULTURAL POLITICS 9-12
(1996); see generally Harvey Gee, Claiming America: Towards a New Understanding of
Assimilation, Pluralism, and Multiculturalism, 7 ASIAN L.J. _ (forthcoming March
2001).
98 Neil Gotanda, Exclusion and Inclusion: Immigration and American Orientalism,
in ACROSS THE PACIFIC: ASIAN AMERICANS AND GLOBALIZATION 129, 130 (Evelyn Hu-
DeHart ed., 1999).
99 Id.; see also LISA LOWE, CRITICAL TERRAINS: FRENCH AND BRITISH
ORIENTALISMS ix (1992) (arguing that "Orientalism is a [heterogeneous] tradition of
representation that is crossed, intersected, and engaged by other representations").
100 Gotanda, supra note 97, at 129, 130.
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ancestry has long avoided mentioning race."°' With respect to
revealing hidden racist intent behind ostensibly race-neutral legal
policymaking decisions, legal scholar-activist Frank Wu has taken
an innovative approach to equal protection analysis, as developed
by Critical Race Theorist Charles Lawrence, and applied it to an
analysis of discriminatory state action against Asian Americans.' 2
Wu explains Lawrence's "cultural meaning test" and its potential
applications:
"This [cultural meaning] test would evaluate governmental
conduct to see if it conveys a symbolic message to which the
culture attaches racial significance." The cultural meaning
approach uses an interpretation of history and current
understandings of legislative action, drawing on social science
methodologies, to tease out conscious, half-conscious, and
unconscious forms of discrimination, in a more nuanced manner
than disproportionate impact theory. It permits inferences of
intent where hidden meanings are not only likely but are the
norm. 1
03
Wu then applies the Lawrence cultural meaning test to the
Japanese internment cases and the contemporary use of the Asian
American "model minority myth" stereotype.' Although beyond
Wu's scope of analysis, his work is also useful in interpreting the
Refugee Act of 1980 and the area of immigration law because
there is such an important cultural meaning to accepting
immigrants and refugees as people within the protection of the
Constitution. °5
A strict legal analysis and interpretation of the language of the
101 Id. at 149.
For Asian Americans, sorting through this new direction of racial politics into
private conduct and political and popular culture is best carried out through
continuing examination of American Orientalism. As an analytical framework,
American Orientalism makes possible an understanding of how the United
States has treated, and continues to treat immigrants of Asian ancestry.
Id.
102 Wu, supra note 50, at 254.
103 Id. at 254-55 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317,
333-34 (1987)).
104 id. at 254-56.
105 Wu, supra note 17, at 50.
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Refugee Act reveals not only the wording about how many
refugees are to be admitted, but also substantive policy
information and associated procedural requirements. The Act,
when considered within its appropriate sociohistorical context,
proves that in formal terms, even a race-based law can be
superficially characterized as being race-neutral.106
The cultural meaning test is necessary to understand why the
Refugee Act was passed.'7 The benefit of the doubt is given to
Congress, and its claim that the Act was passed for humanitarian
reasons alone avoids any need to characterize them as "racist."
Whether the Act might be properly classified as "racist," however,
is deeply complicated. Many were concerned with the fiscal
consequences of the apparently limitless flow of refugees entering
this country. Some members of Congress echoed the fears of their
constituents of a loss of control over their culture, society, and
lives. If nothing else, it is difficult to refute the claim that the
ethnicity and race of the refugees played at least some role in the
Act's passage.
The Refugee Act was the product of truly complex
relationships of political forces in the United States. Neil Gotanda
suggests that, "[historically and modernly,] legislation affecting
immigrants and immigration at the state and federal levels...
106 Wu, supra note 50, at 256.
107 Kenneth Karst believes that the politics of exclusion are intertwined with judicial
review. Aware that America has always been a multicultural nation, Karst criticizes
equal protection jurisprudence centered solely on legislative deliberation. He questions
the value of reason-based legislative motives. In the process, Karst notes the difficulties
entailed in any search for the unconscious, ideology-based motivations that lie beneath a
legislator's vote. According to Karst, "[e]ach of the contending cultures, after all, sees
the other as ideology-laden. . . .The problem with a judicial inquiry focused on a
legislator's 'reasoned analysis' is not merely theoretical; it has serious practical
implications." KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S ExPRESSION: VISIONS OF
POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 175 (1993). Along these same
lines, Karst states that "it is also especially difficult for judges to envision a legislative
classification's roots as being based in 'ideology' when the law discriminated against a
particular group that has been customarily low in the food chain of political importance."
Id. This same approach has been taken by Kevin Johnson in his insightful examination of
California's Proposition 227 Initiative, "English for the Children." Kevin R. Johnson &
George Martinez, Discrimination by Proxy: The Case of Proposition 227 and the Ban on
Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1227, 1227 (2000). Johnson argues that "[i]t
is now an especially appropriate time to analyze the circumstances surrounding the
initiative's passage, because, as time passes, it becomes more difficult to marshal the
evidence necessary to prove this discriminatory intent." Id.
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have all involved considerations toward constructing American
Orientalism."'0 8 In Congress, anti-refugee and anti-immigration
attitudes were captured and used to effuse bipartisan support for
the passage of the Act. °9 The Refugee Act won bipartisan support
because it tapped into populist sentiment at several levels.
Vietnamese refugees were perceived to injure working citizens by
taking jobs."0 The Act, at least in part, was an effort directed at
dissuading "those" Vietnamese with "their" language and "their"
culture from entering this country."'
A traditional and formal legal outlook of the Act would take
the law at face value, and consider it as positive law. Such an
approach would enable government officials to rationalize and
dismiss any allegations of racism, which would be considered
reasonable and legitimate, absent a consideration of context. Kevin
Johnson suggests that "the heavy burden of proving the
discriminatory intent of [government] ... makes an equal
protection claim based on race especially problematic.""' 2 He
contends that "[d]octrinal uncertainty concerning alienage
classifications and the frequent link between alienage status and
race, ethnicity, and color, further complicate matters.""' 3 However,
when context is restored, an understanding of the circumstances
and motivations behind the passage of the Act becomes apparent
and realized. As such, the popular perception of the Refugee Act
as a good law gives way to the reality that the law was actually
bad. Likewise, in its formal function, the democratic legislature is
involved in an elaborate network of external relations in its efforts
108 Gotanda, supra note 97, at 131.
109 See Admission of Refugees into the United States: Hearing on H.R. 3056 Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and Int'l Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong. 68 (1977) (testimony of Hon. John W. DeWitt, Deputy
Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs).
110 Kathryn M. Bockley, Comment, A Historical Overview of Refugee Legislation:
The Deception of Foreign Policy in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 253, 276 (1995) ("The Vietnamese were perceived as potential competitors for jobs
and federalized programs.").
I Johnson, supra note 92, at 1142 ("Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980...
with the hope of reducing the number of refugees that the President admitted from
Vietnam."). Cf. Johnson, supra note 90, at 181.
12 See Johnson, supra note 90, at 673.
",3 Id. at 673.
[Vol. 26
THE REFUGEE BURDEN
to establish and maintain legal order."4 This legitimate purpose, if
coupled with a consideration of the long history of providing
refuge to foreign nationals displaced by war or persecution, may
pass any heightened scrutiny by the American public and the
international community. In absence of the cultural meaning test,
the Refugee Act is treated solely as a law passed to address the
refugee crisis after the end of the Vietnam War.
Analyzed under a purely formalist approach to legal
interpretation, an immigration law lauded as being passed for
humanitarian reasons goes unquestioned and unchallenged, as
would any other legislative measure passed with the power vested
in Congress by the United States Constitution.
The Act was tantamount to a resurrection of historical nativism
and provided the impetus for its current resurgence. Without
doubt, contemporary nativism is race-based.' Asian and Latino
immigrants have become the scapegoats for the United States'
economic troubles, and they are usually targeted because they
represent the two largest racial categories of immigrants. Asian
and Latino immigrants have been criticized for their inability to
assimilate and "fit in." The most prominent attacks have been
espoused by restrictionists such as Patrick Buchanan, Peter
Brimelow, and David Duke,"6 whose rhetoric has been based on
114 WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
CONGRESS AND THE STATES 1 (7th ed. 1989).
Complex social systems require institutions that will establish and maintain the
legal order, receive and settle conflicts, set priorities, make and legitimize
policies, and adapt existing rules of society to new conditions. . . . The
legislature does not and cannot maintain an independent group life. Instead, it is
involved in an elaborate network of external relations, some of which it has
designed and developed for its purposes and others of which have been thrust
upon it.
Id.; see also SAMUEL C. PATTERSON, STATE LEGISLATORS AND THE LEGISLATURES IN
POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 187 (Virginia Gray et al. eds., 5th ed. 1989) (listing
the main work of the legislature as the processing of bills and the engaging in oversight
of the Executive Branch). "Six factors seem most systematically to influence the
decisions on policy that legislators make: (1) their party and party leaders, (2)
committees, (3) staff, (4) lobbyists representing private interest groups and executive
agencies, (5) the governor, and (6) constituents in the legislator's districts." Id. at 189.
115 Cf. HYMAN RUCHLIS & SANDRA ODDO, CLEAR THINKING: A PRACTICAL
INTRODUCTION 179 (1990) (declaring that "misconceptions, intertwined with stereotypes
and prejudices intensify many of today's group hatreds and conflicts").
116 HING, supra note 93, at 147-48. For a comprehensive review of Hing's volume,
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the flawed propositions that America has a strictly white,
Christian, European heritage, and that immigrants of color fail to
acculturate. "7
The reaction to the Vietnamese resettlements was
overwhelmingly negative. Economic and social class divisions
were also contributing factors to this interethnic conflict."'
Notably, the racial tensions between Vietnamese and other Asian
immigrants, and between Latinos and African Americans reveal
volumes about the inadequacy of the traditional black/white
paradigm of race relations that has developed in this country.
Historically, this inter-group dynamic has gone largely unnoticed
due to the inadequacies of the bipolar dichotomy to measure
interracial conflict. 19
Kevin Johnson has suggested "that the debate about
immigration is really about a larger social debate about race in this
country.""'2 He claims that, historically, the dominant images of
immigrants in society have had a tremendous, albeit detrimental,
influence on the formation of law and policy towards
immigrants. 2 ' To Johnson, "immigrants of color have been singled
out for particular antipathy, the most negative imagery, and the
harshest of laws and policies."'22 He considers that "[a]t various
see Gee, supra note 97.
". HING, supra note 93, at 147-48.
118 See, e.g., Alice H. Choi, A Closer Look at the Conflict Between the African
American and the Korean American Communities in South Central Los Angeles, 1
ASIAN AM. PAC. Is. L.J. 69, 69-72 (1993) (addressing the sources of conflict between
Korean merchants and African Americans, which lead to incidents such as the Soon Ja
Du and Latasha Harlins incidents); Mari Matsuda, We Will Not Be Used, 1 ASIAN AM.
PAC. Is. L.J. 79, 79-81 (1993) (examining the use of Asian Americans as a wedge group
to further divide racial minority communities and to weaken race relations).
119 Aside from the differences between conservatives and liberals on immigration,
there has been a great deal of discussion among liberals on the issue. Latino activist
organizations have generally opposed measures to limit immigration because their
communities represent a sizable immigrant population, and thus would experience the
adverse effects of any heightened immigration enforcement. Conversely, African
American communities have expressed fears about the perceived negative impact of
immigration. The Korean-African American conflicts in Los Angeles after the release of
the Rodney King verdict in 1992 are examples of the concerns motivating African
American ambivalence towards immigration. See Johnson, supra note 90, at 640-42.
120 Johnson, supra note 90, at 181.
121 Id. at 173.
122 Id. at 166.
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times in U.S. history . . . the difference of race has inflamed
nativist sentiment. This makes perfect sense [because] of the
central importance of race in this country. People of color who are
citizens often are viewed as the other, foreign, un-American, and
an internal minority."'23
Under the theory of racial animus advanced by Kevin Johnson,
immigration laws are defended as being "colorblind" because they
do not explicitly discriminate on the basis of race.1 24 Yet, in their
application, they disproportionately and negatively affect
communities of color. Nonetheless, "modem restrictionists
regularly deny that race is the reason for the immigration
policy." '25 "Instead, they employ other non-race-based arguments
that too many people are immigrating to the United States.'
26
B. Contextual Background: The Roots of Anti-Asian Animus
1. Historical Nativism
Professor Gabriel Chin claims that:
Control of the potentially massive numbers of would-be Asian
immigrants was [always] a special focus of American
immigration law . . . . Asians were the only group whose
immigration was restricted on the basis of race. A consistent
feature of anti-Asian immigration laws was categorization by
race and ancestry, rather than by place of birth. 7
123 Id. at 167.
124 Id. at 174. Kevin Johnson has recently extended and applied his racial animus
theory to the 1998 California ballot measure, Proposition 227 Initiative, "English for the
Children," passed by California voters to prohibit bilingual education programs for non-
English speakers in the state's public school system. Johnson & Martinez, supra note
107, at 1227.
125 Johnson, supra note 90, at 174.
126 Id.
127 Chin, supra note 63, at 280-81; see also Richard P. Cole & Gabriel J. Chin,
Emerging from the Margins of Historical Consciousness: Chinese Immigrants and the
History of American Law, 17 LAW & IIST. REv. 325, 332 (1999) ("Chinese immigrants
played a more central role in a second revolution in American government that began
during the late nineteenth century. It endowed the federal government with broad and
exclusive powers to make law regulating immigration."); Estelle T. Lau, Excavating the
"Chinese Wall": Towards a Socio-Historical Perspective on the Development of United
States Immigration Administration and Chinese Exclusion, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1068,
1073 (1998) (book review) (arguing that the exclusion of Chinese marked the first
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The racialization of Asian Americans and Asian immigrants as
foreign-born outsiders has been a pervasive undercurrent in Asian
American history.'28 This resulted in racial prejudice as reflected in
immigration,'29 business, 30 and education,' 3' as well as on social
restrictive immigration policy in the United States); Derek Ludwin, Note, Can Courts
Confer Citizenship? Plenary Power and Equal Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1376,
1380 (1999) (emphasizing that "fiun the early history of the United States, naturalized
citizenship was available only to 'free white persons' who satisfied basic residency and
good moral character requirements .... Chinese aliens, for example, were statutorily
prohibited from naturalizing until 1943").
28 Cole & Chin, supra note 127, at 325 (suggesting that recent legal studies recast
the historical role of Chinese immigrants, shaping their own history and contributing to
the development of American legal culture); see also Lucy SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS
TIGERS 2 (1996) (reporting that the Chinese played an essential, though indirect, role in
the development of immigration law).
129 See, e.g., RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF
MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 200-01 (1993) (describing the hostile political climate toward
Chinese immigrants); KAREN K. NARASAKI, DISCRIMINATION AND THE NEED FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LEGISLATION IN PERSPECTIVES ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND ITS
IMPACT ON ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS 5 (LEAP Asian Pacific American Public Policy
Institute ed., 1995) (summarizing American history replete with instances of
institutionalized discrimination against Asian Pacific Americans).
The Asian Americans who made it to the United States in previous generations
experienced familiar forms of racial discrimination at the hands of the law.
They were subject to electoral disenfranchisement, exclusion from desirable
neighborhoods through restrictive covenants, testimonial disqualification,
school segregation, prohibitions on property ownership, racial violence,
prohibitions on marriage to whites, unequal enforcement of racially neutral
laws, and disqualifications from many businesses and professions.
Gabriel Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
Constitutional Law of Immigrants, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1, 44-45 (1998).
130 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (invalidating racially motivated
laundry ordinances). Business prospects for Asians were also limited because of
discrimination. Id.; see also Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil
Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CAL. L. REv.
529, 534-39 (1984) (detailing accusations of "unfair labor" made against the Chinese by
labor leaders, newspapers, and politicians). Cf. Thomas Wuil Joo, New "Conspiracy
Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment: Nineteenth Century Chinese Civil Rights Cases
and the Development of Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 353,
355 (1995) (arguing that "the Chinese rights jurisprudence culminating in Yick Wo was
possible because the interests of Chinese aliens in fighting state discrimination
converged with the interests of the federal judiciary in extending the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect economic interests from state interference").
'3' See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974) (holding that the school
district's failure to provide English language instructions violated the Civil Rights Act of
1964); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1927) (interpreting the separate but equal
THE REFUGEE BURDEN
and political levels.'32 Unfortunately, this discrimination began as
soon as the first Chinese immigrants set foot on American
shores.'33 Chinese Americans were not the only Asian Americans
to be subjected to a history of discrimination. Japanese immigrants
and their American-born children also endured great hardship and
animosity, even before the bombing of Pearl Harbor.'34
doctrine against a native-born Chinese United States citizen who was attending a
separate public school).
132 Johnson, supra note 90, at 168 (reporting that "Chinese immigrants found it
impossible to assimilate. This resulted in no small part from resistance to their
assimilation by dominant American society. Neither the courts nor the body politic
accepted the Chinese as members of the national community."); Chin, supra note 63, at
23 (discussing racially motivated exclusion of Asian immigrants during the nineteenth
century); Johnson, supra note 90, at 167-68 (describing horrendous treatment of Chinese
immigrants by federal, state, and local governments during the 1800s).
13' See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTS., RECENT ACTIVITIES AGAINST CITIZENS AND
RESIDENTS OF ASIAN DESCENT 7 (1986) [hereinafter U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTS.]
(explaining that discriminatory laws were enacted against immigrants as soon as they
arrived in the United States); John Hayakawa Torok, Asians and the Reconstruction Era
Constitutional Amendments and Civil Rights Laws, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND CONGRESS,
supra note 63, at 14 (stating that Chinese immigrants soon experienced institutionalized
discrimination in law and public policy after their migration to California during the
Gold Rush period); Daina Chiu, Comment, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion,
Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1053, 1060 (1994) (asserting that
Americans have historically discriminated against Asians and precluded them from
participating in American society by enacting immigration laws); see also K. Scott
Wong, Cultural Defenders and Brokers: Chinese Responses to the Anti-Chinese
Movement, in CLAIMING AMERICA: CONSTRUCTING CHINESE AMERICAN IDENTITIES
DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA 4 (1998) (reporting that "American opposition to the
Chinese presence in the United States centered on two main issues, economics and race,
both of which were usually framed as a critique of Chinese culture").
The first naturalization law, passed in 1790, restricted naturalization to "free
White persons." This was amended in 1870, after the Civil War, to include
persons of African descent. Since Asian immigrants were deemed to be neither
White nor of African descent, they could not become citizens. In numerous
cases, culminating in a pair of Supreme Court decisions in the 1920s, judges
repeatedly recognized that Asian applicants for naturalization were qualified in
every respect but one: They were not White.
GABRIEL CHIN, ET AL., BEYOND SELF-INTEREST: ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS TOWARD A
COMMUNITY OF JUSTICE: A POLICY ANALYSIS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 14 (1996).
'04 See Gee, Changing Landscapes, supra note 4, at 629 n.42 (outlining possible
reasons for anti-Chinese behavior).
After getting rid of the Chinese, employers began to encourage Japanese
workers to immigrate. Later, white workers rallied to exclude the Japanese,
pressuring the U.S. government into signing the infamous "Gentleman's
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Much to America's chagrin, the Japanese American internment
and the nineteenth century anti-Chinese legislation are quite
illustrative of how the ethnic backgrounds of immigrants can
inflame public opinion and legal policy as well as how race and
immigration status are often combined to enhance the unpopularity
of immigrants. In fact, this latter interrelationship between race
and immigration has even been categorized into what is now
referred to as "nativism," a term that has been defined as an
"intense opposition to an internal minority" because of the
minority's foreign connections.' In this regard, nativism has often
been linked to the history of Asian American discrimination.1
6
2. Modem Era Nativism
The recently enacted immigration policies of the late 1990s,
which targeted Asian and Latino immigrants, are the latest
manifestations of the social construction of these racial groups as
foreigners not entitled to equal protection under the law.' 7 The
failure to incorporate racial meanings into immigration laws and
policies means that law rooted in citizenship, sovereignty, or
Agreement" of 1907 with the Japanese government, which barred Japanese
laborers from leaving Japan for America. The exclusion of the Chinese and
Japanese did not, of course, stop the employers' demand for a continued supply
of more cheap labor from Asia, or white labor's insistent demand for the
exclusion of all Asians.
PETER KWONG, FORBIDDEN WORKERS: ILLEGAL CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN
LABOR 147 (Andrd Schiffrin ed., 1997).
135 Linda S. Bosniak, "Nativism" the Concept, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 22,
at 281; see also Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the
Inter/National Imagination, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 309, 316-17 (1998) (examining the
constitutive relationship between nativism and racism); Harvey Gee, Immigration and
the New Nativism: A Review Essay, 52 OKLA. L. REv. 685, 686-87 (1999) (book review)
(discussing the origins of the nativism movement against immigrants and the enactment
of recent nativist legislation in California).
136 Chang & Aoki, supra note 135, at 309 ("In the United States, this differentialist
racism, might be termed nativistic racism. Nativistic racism is not just an intersectional
term, but signifies that both nativism and racism are mutually constitutive of the other
and operate in tandem to preserve a specific conception of the nation."); see also Gee,
Asian Americans, the Law, and Illegal Immigration, supra note 4, at 76 (1999)
(illustrating the nativistic racism and stereotyping that plagues Asian Americans and
addressing the link between the history of discrimination against Asian Americans and
contemporary discriminatory acts).
137 Gee, supra note 134, at 685.
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national interest may mask racism. "8 A close analysis of modern-
day nativism reveals that the contemporary immigration debates
are not really about economics, but instead are about race.'39
This immigrant reform fervor has also caught the attention of
the American public,4 ' and the recent increase in legislation is in
large part fueled by growing anti-immigrant sentiments against
Asians.'' As this anti-immigration animus and xenophobia gained
momentum, it culminated in recent legislation such as California's
Proposition 187,142 English-Only laws,' 3  and the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996.14
138 Id. at 686.
139 Id.
140 Robert J. Schulman, Children of a Lesser God: Should the Fourteenth
Amendment Be Altered or Repealed to Deny Automatic Citizenship Rights and Privileges
to American Born Children of Illegal Aliens?, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 669, 672 n.16 (1995).
4' Matt Spetalnick, Republicans Attack Citizenship Rights of Immigrants, REUTERS
N. AM. WIRE, Aug. 7, 1996, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
142 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (Deering 1999); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Public
Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender,
and Class, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1509, 1510 (1995) (stating that "California's Proposition
187, an extreme response to the public's concern with immigration, drew national
attention"). "The groundswell of support for Proposition 187 showed how extreme the
California electorate could be." Id. at 1559.
14 Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc)
vacating as moot, Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. 43 (1997); see also
Johnson & Martinez, supra note 107, at 1227; see also Juan F. Perea, Demography and
Distrust; An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77
MINN. L. REV. 269 (1992); Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On Making of Invisible
People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 965, 978-81 (1995); Frank H. Wu, New Paradigms of Civil
Rights: A Review Essay, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 698, 707 (1998) (reviewing PETER D.
SALINS, ASSIMILATION, AMERICAN STYLE (1997); DALE MAHARIDGE, THE COMING
WHITE MINORITY: CALIFORNIA'S ERUPTIONS AND THE NATION'S FUTURE (1996); MARTHA
MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW (1997)); see
generally Donna F. Coltharp, Speaking the Language of Exclusion: How Equal
Protection and Fundamental Rights Analyses Permit Language Discrimination, 28 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 149 (1996) (identifying efforts to enforce English-Only rules in the
workplace and in the educational context).
144 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); see, e.g., Andrew Leong, The Asian
Exclusion Act of 1996: Welfare Reform and Asian Pacific America, 7 ASIAN AMER.
POL'Y REv. 88 (1997); Yeh Ling Ling, Facing The Facts: Welfare & Immigration
Policy, 7 ASIAN AMER. POL'Y REv. 107 (1997); Karen K. Narasaki & Jayne Park,
Human Rights, Civil Rights and the New Welfare Legislation, 7 ASIAN AMER. POL'Y
REV. 102 (1997); Peter J. Spiro, Questioning Barriers to Naturalization, 13 GEO.
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The hostile anti-immigrant environment in the United States is
exemplified in the Federal Welfare Reform Act and California's
Proposition 187. In particular, Proposition 187 is a weapon that
nativists have used to close the nation's borders. Under
Proposition 187, undocumented immigrants, primarily Latinos and
Asians, are denied access to public school education, non-
emergency health care from state and local governments, and
government social services.' 5 Furthermore, the current backlash
against immigrants has also found its way into the controversies
over bilingual education and bilingual ballots, which also reflect
the more fundamental debate over linguistic pluralism and the
place of non-English languages in public life.'46 Law Professors
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefanic observe that:
Echoing themes from California history, including denying the
Japanese the right to own land, the Chinese in San Francisco to
license laundries, and the Mexicans the right to speak their
language, the campaign for Proposition 187 bore unmistakable
overtones of xenophobia and exclusionism. It featured television
commercials showing a flood of foreign-looking people with a
narrator's voice intoning, "They keep coming." Governor Pete
Wilson even lobbied President Bill Clinton to have legal aliens
declared ineligible for federal welfare benefits. 147
It was common knowledge that resistance to large-scale,
uncontrolled refugee admission and immigration was likely to
increase among the American public.' 8 Jean Stefanic considers
this anti-immigrant animus in terms of socioeconomic stresses and
competition over shrinking resources and jobs.' 9 Richard Delgado
IMMIGR. L.J. 479, 483 (1999) (discussing the serious setbacks for immigrants in the form
of a welfare bill that makes eligibility for federal benefits contingent on citizenship).
141 Gee, supra note 134, at 687.
146 Id. at 686.
'47 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic, California's Racial History and
Constitutional Rationales for Race-Conscious Decision Making in Higher Education, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1521, 1555 (2000). Richard Delgado and Jean Stefanic have recently
documented the ambivalent treatment of citizens of color beginning in its early days and
continuing into the present. Id. California's momentum has inspired broad action around
the country at the state level. Id.
148 SUCHENG CHAN, ASIAN AMERICANS: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY 100 (Charles
Wykle ed., 1991).
141 Jean Stefanic, Funding the Nativist Agenda, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!, supra note 22,
at 119.
[Vol. 26
THE REFUGEE BURDEN
argues that "[h]istory teaches that nativist movements tend to
flourish when the country's social and economic situation is
unsettled and then [tend] to take one of two broad forms. Society
enacts restrictive immigration laws and policies to keep
foreigners-usually ones of darker coloration-out."' 0 Delgado
asserts that anti-immigrant measures have the specific aim of
making immigration or naturalization difficult and that recent
policies favoring the elimination of social services for immigrants
illustrate forms of legal treatment designed to disadvantage the
foreign born. 5'
C. Origins of Asylum Law and the Core of the Refugee Act
The United States has always taken pride in its long history of
providing refuge to foreign nationals displaced by war or
persecution.'52 The modern human rights movement began its
revolution with the events surrounding the end of World War 11.' 3
The atrocities committed by the Nazi regime during the Holocaust
provided the impetus."' Professor Hing observes that:
[The tensions between humanitarian aims and practical
concerns] make plain the link between refugee and immigration
policy. In the 1930s for example, the United States turned away
thousands of Jews fleeing Nazi Persecution, in large part
because of the powerful restrictions then dominating
immigration laws. Congress and U.S. consular officers
consistently resisted Jewish efforts to emigrate and impeded any
significant emergency realization or limitation on quota. A 1939
refugee bill would have rescued twenty thousand German
children had it not been defeated on the grounds that children
would exceed the German quota.1
55
150 Delgado, supra note 22, at 318.
151 Id. at 318-19.
152 BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH
IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850-1990 123 (Richard Delgado ed., 1993).
153 John A. Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Controls, 36 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 819, 847 (1982) ("Immediately after World War II, the United States
began admitting large numbers of refugees and displaced persons to its shores.").
154 HING, supra note 152, at 123.
15 Id. at 124; see also James F. Smith, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 227, 236
(1995) (reporting that in 1939 Congress defeated a bill to rescue 20,000 from Nazi
Germany on the grounds that it would exceed the German quota). Cf Wendy B. Davis &
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"The international community was so outraged at the egregious
acts of inhumanity committed that it could not let such acts go
ignored.""'5 Since then, refugee laws and policies have always
reflected the intractable tensions between humanitarian aims and
practical domestic and international concerns.
The early steps toward aligning American law with the
minimum standards of protection owed to refugees under
international law were reflected in the Refugee Acts enacted after
World War II. Hundreds of thousands were escorted to this
nation's shores by various congressional acts that, on an ad hoc
basis, superseded the national quota systems.'57 For example, the
1948 Displaced Persons Act enabled 400,000 refugees and
displaced persons to enter from Europe, and in 1953, the Refugee
Relief Act admitted 200,000 refugees, including 18,000
Hungarians and 28,000 refugees of the Chinese Revolution. 5 '
Perhaps the most significant international instrument upon which
United States refugee law is based is the 1951 United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention). 59
The Convention arose out of an increasing international
concern for refugees.' ° The Convention extended protections,
Angela D. Atchue, No Physical Harm, No Asylum: Denying a Safe Haven for Refugees,
5 TEX. FOR. ON C.L. & C.R 81, 120 (2000) (claiming that "Jews fleeing the Nazi regime
in the 1930's would today be denied asylum under the courts' present interpretation of
persecution, because they have not yet been physically harmed").
156 HING, supra note 152, at 123.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; see also NAGENDRA SINGH,
ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: IN PEACE AND WAR AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY
152 (1986) (explaining that the Convention was adopted on July 28, 1951 by the United
Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless
Persons). The Convention became effective on April 22, 1954. Id.; see also Guy S.
GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1983) (recognizing that the
Convention continues to be the foremost international instrument protecting the rights of
refugees); Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. HUM.
RTs. J. 229, 299 (1996) (arguing that the Convention remains the primary instrument for
the protection of refugees).
160 See Office of United National High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention
and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, para. 5, at 3 (2d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter Handbook for Determining Refugee Status] (noting that the uniform
agreement protecting refugees was necessary following World War II, focusing
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which were originally intended as temporary measures, to address
the rising numbers of displaced individuals in Europe.'6 ' The
substantive language of the Convention provides two principles
relevant to current refugee law in the United States. The most
essential principle established by the Convention is the definition
of the term "refugee."' 62 In Article 1, the Convention establishes
that a refugee is an individual who has a well-founded fear of
persecution in his or her country of origin based on "race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."'63
The United States and other non-European countries did not
sign the 1951 Convention. 6" The 1952 McCarran-Walter Act,
however, granted the Attorney General discretionary authority to
"parole" into the United States any alien for emergency reasons
deemed strictly in the public interest.'65  This permitted
policymaking consistent with their political preference for
refugees from communism.'66 The original intent was to apply this
primarily on protecting individuals fleeing their homeland because of government
persecution), in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. RESPONSES 3 (Ved
P. Nanda ed., 1989); Michele Altermus, The Sanctuary Movement, 9 WHITTIER L. REv.
683, 688 (1988) (explaining that the Convention arose because of massive displacement
resulting from World War II).
161 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 159, at 12 (reiterating the fact that the
Convention's protection was limited to individuals eligible for refugee status as a result
of events before January 1, 1951); Fitzpatrick, supra note 159, at 232 (explaining that the
Convention's protection was limited to certain individuals).
162 The UNHCR argues that two elements must be considered when determining
refugee status: (1) the individual's frame of mind; and (2) whether that frame of mind is
"supported by an objective situation." Handbook for Determining Refugee Status, supra
note 160, para. 38, at 11-12.
163 Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections from
Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1179, 1197-98 (1994) (noting that the
definition of refugee originates in the Constitution of the International Refugee
Organization (IRO)).
64 Brian K. McCalmon, Note, States, Refugees, and Self-Defense, 10 GEo. IMMIGR.
L.J. 215, 218 (1996) (stating that United States did not sign Convention). Eighteen out of
the twenty-three European nations became parties to the Convention before 1960. David
A. Martin, The New Asylum Seekers, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN
THE 1980s 2 (David A. Martin ed., 1988) [hereinafter THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS].
165 Martin, supra note 164.
166 William R. Tamayo, Asian Americans and the McCarran-Walter Act, in ASIAN
AMERICANS AND CONGRESS, supra note 63, at 348-49.
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parole authority on an individual basis.' 61 For example, the 1956
Hungarian refugee crisis led to the expanded use of parole
authority to accommodate those fleeing communist oppression.'68
Similarly, the parole authority was used to admit more than 15,000
Chinese who fled mainland China after the 1949 Communist
takeover and more than 145,000 Cubans who sought refuge from
Cuba after Fidel Castro's 1959 coup.'69
The United States later acceded to the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,'70 (the Protocol) which
effectively adopted and extended the Convention's protections. '
The Protocol modernized the Convention by removing the
Convention's temporal and geographic limitations in order to meet
the burgeoning refugee problem that persisted beyond World War
I172
The greatest significance of the Protocol continues to be its
embodiment of the international community's commitment to
comply with Article 33(1) of the Convention. No contracting
nation-state may be a party to the Protocol without agreeing to the
minimum standard of protection under Article 33(1) of the
Convention-the mandatory requirement of withholding of
deportation of refugees who would otherwise face certain
167 HING, supra note 93, at 27.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 556-57 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that the
Refugee Act of 1980 attempted to comply with the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees by incorporating Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention); Handbook for
Determining Refugee Status, supra note 160, para. 9, at 4 (concluding that accession to
the Protocol binds signatories to Convention's principles).
'7' 142 CONG. REc. S 11905 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of UNHCR Rep.
Bijleveld) (noting the United States' obligations to the Convention's principles through
1967 Protocol's incorporation of Convention); see also Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Toward a
Broader Definition of Refugee: 20th Century Development Trends, 20 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 315, 319 (1990) (stating that the Protocol sought to eliminate temporal limitations of
the Convention).
172 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 159, at 13 (discussing the Protocol's extension
of the Convention's protection to individuals otherwise not within the Convention's
limited protection); McCalmon, supra note 164, at 218 (noting that the Protocol's
expansion of the Convention's protections was triggered by decolonization of African
states in the 1960s).
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persecution. 173
Although the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol, it did
not establish formal procedures for granting asylum and
withholding of deportation until the Refugee Act of 1980,' 4 which
established the first statutory procedures for administration of
refugee and asylum cases in the United States."' Before the advent
of the Refugee Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
conducted asylum proceedings through regulations pursuant to the
U.S. Attorney General's broad discretionary authority. 7 6 The
173 Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Aliens and the Duty of
Nonrefoulement: Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 15 IMMIGR. & NAT'LITY L. REv.
333, 346 (1994) (arguing that the principle of nonrefoulement is nonderogable and that
no reservation should be allowed).
174 Deborah E Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case
Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory
Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 437 (1992) (emphasizing that the
purpose of the Refugee Act was to "eliminate ad hoc treatment of refugees"); see also
Scanlan, supra note 153, at 847 ("The [Refugee] Act arose from a long history of ad hoc
decision making to admit particular groups of refugees, Congressional reaction to the
executive's domination of that decision making process, and a desire to better coordinate
admission decisions with follow-up resettlement and welfare programs."); Karen K.
Jorgensen, The Role of the U.S. Congress and the Courts in the Application of the
Refugee Act of 1980, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND U.S.
RESPONSES 129, 131 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1989) (quoting Senator Kennedy as stating that
"present law and practice is inadequate, and that the piecemeal approach of our
government" in refugee cases is intolerable); see generally Anker & Posner, supra note
83, at 9 (detailing the legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980).
175 See Doris Meissner, Reflections on the Refugee Act of 1980, in THE NEW
ASYLUM SEEKERS, supra note 164, at 58 (stating that the Refugee Act provides a solution
to the fragmented and inefficient handling of refugee cases); J. Michael Cavosie, Note,
Defending the Golden Door: The Persistence of Ad Hoc and Ideological Decision
Making in U.S. Refugee Law, 67 IND. L.J. 411, 424 (1992) (explaining that Congress
added the definition of "refugee" for the first time in the Refugee Act of 1980 to conform
with international obligations).
176 8 U.S.C. § 1103(9)(a) (1982). Michelle N. Lewis, Note, The Political-Offense
Exception: Reconciling the Tension Between Human Rights and International Public
Order, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 585, 599 (1995) (noting that prior to the Refugee Act, the
Attorney General had complete discretion over asylum); see also Anker, supra note 174,
at 438-39 (maintaining that the Refugee Act was enacted to achieve uniform, fair and
impartial asylum procedures); William Sanchez & Aldalshinda Lomangino, Political
Asylum and Other Forms of Relief, 66 FLA. B.J. 18, 18 (1992) (claiming that the Refugee
Act created refugee and asylum procedures in an attempt to end "ad hoc treatment" of
such applications); see generally Marvin Samuel Gross, Comment, Refugee-Parolee:
The Dilemma of the Indochina Refugee, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 171-91 (1975)
(discussing the use of parole authority as it relates to Indochinese refugees).
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Refugee Act signified Congress' express intent to move the United
States into accord with the obligations imposed under international
refugee law. 77
In passing the Refugee Act, Congress adopted the international
legal definition of refugee and attempted to establish a uniform
standard for adjudicating refugee and asylum claims.'78 The
Refugee Act incorporated the mandatory nonrefoulement
requirement, essentially verbatim from the 1967 Protocol, into the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). "9 Moreover, the Refugee
Act required a balancing of factors to determine whether an alien
convicted of an aggravated felony could be excluded under the
narrow exception to nonrefoulement laid out in the Convention."'
177 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987) (stating that the purpose of
the Act "was to bring United States refugee law into conformance" with the Protocol);
138 CONG. REc. S115274, S15275 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (describing Refugee Act's embodiment of nonrefoulement principle contained
in 1957 Convention and 1967 Protocol); Jividen, supra note 88, at 954 (explaining that
Congress intended the Act to be "construed consistently" with the 1967 Protocol).
178 Jacqueline Reardon, Deportation-Applying an Objective Standard to
Determining a "Well-Founded Fear of Persecution," 13 SuFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 855,
859 (1990) (stating that the Refugee Act of 1980 marked a significant revision of the
United States' immigration policy); James F. Smith, A Nation That Welcomes
Immigrants? An Historical Examination of United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 236 (1995) (stating that the Refugee Act of 1980 was
designed to bring the United States into conformity with the Refugee Protocol of 1968,
which followed the 1951 Convention); see also Sanchez & Lomangino, supra note 176,
at 18 (noting that the Act adopted the international definition of refugee).
179 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982). The Act defined a "refugee" as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.... The term refugee does not include any person who ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion.
Id.; see also Leon Wildes, The Dilemma of the Refugee: His Standard for Relief, 4
CARDOZO L. REV. 353, 369-70 (1983) (stating that Congress followed Protocol in
defining "refugee").
180 Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982) (maintaining that
most deportation proceedings should be determined on a case-by-case basis).
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V. Post-Vietnam War Aftermath
A. Richard Nixon, America, and the Unwinnable War
"Vietnam marked the end of an era in world history and of
American foreign policy, an era marked by constructive
achievements but blemished by ultimate, although not irreparable
failure.
'1 8
'
When North Vietnam maintained its military pressure against
South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, Nixon gradually disengaged
from the war, and reduced United States' troop strength in
Vietnam from 550,000 in 1969, to about 30,000 late in 1972.812
During this time, Nixon declined to set a date for the withdrawal
of all U.S. troops, and simultaneously accelerated the training of
Vietnam's armed forces.'83 Nixon chose to expand the war, and
argued that there was a need to protect the lives of American
troops; thus, he approved a joint United States-Vietnamese attack
against Communist sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia in April
1970.18' A critical Congress barred the President from any further
use of American ground combat troops in Cambodia and Laos,
and some congressmen sought to impose a time limit on United
States participation in the war.'
85
In the spring of 1972, the combination of military pressure and
the likelihood of Nixon's reelection persuaded North Vietnam to
bargain more earnestly for a cessation of hostilities.'86 An
agreement was finally devised that provided for the withdrawal of
all American troops from South Vietnam, the creation of an
international commission to supervise the truce, and a framework
within which various Vietnamese factions were to work towards
181 GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND
VIETNAM, 1950-1975 281 (2d ed. 1986).
182 LLOYD C. GARDNER, PAY ANY PRICE: LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE WARS FOR
VIETNAM 542-43 (1995); see also MICHAEL H. HUNT, LYNDON JOHNSON'S WAR;
AMERICA'S COLD WAR CRUSADE IN VIETNAM 118-22; VIETNAM AND AMERICA 427-433
(Marvin E. Gettleman et al. eds., 1995).
183 GARDNER, supra note 182, at 542-43.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
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reconciliation.'87 The Vietnam War was deeply embedded in the
United States' psyche. In the immediate aftermath of the War, the
United States experienced selective and collective amnesia. '88
Journalist Joseph C. Harsch said in 1975 that "[t]oday it is almost
as though the war had never happened."'89 Many public figures
avoided the issue, as well as any finger-pointing about the great
debacle.'9° And because both the Republicans and Democrats were
deeply implicated in the war, it never became a partisan political
issue. ,9
Unlike other post-war periods, Vietnam veterans came home
to a nation that was either hostile to them or indifferent to their
plight.'9 2 When forced to discuss Vietnam, Americans remained
confused and divided about its meaning, particularly its
implications for U.S. foreign policy.' 3 The Vietnam War
significantly weakened the power of the United States and
demoralized this country. It was the only war in which the United
States was unable to claim victory, and it was the third major war
against an Asian country. It was also a very unpopular war and the
most controversial political issue on the home front. '
The tremendous indifference of many, as well as the general
attitude favoring withdrawal, gradually gave way to bitter
memories of the Vietnam War. These sentiments combined with
the frustration of the Iranian hostage crisis to produce a growing
nationalistic assertiveness and a yearning to restore the United
States to its pre-Vietnam position exuding dominant power and
187 Id.
188 HERRING, supra note 181, at 273.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 274.
193 Id. at 275.
194 KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS: DECEPTION, DISTRACTION, AND
DEMOCRACY 238 (1992) (considering the Vietnam War as the most political issue of the
decade of the 1970s). "The Vietnam War was a matter of ongoing presidential and
congressional concern throughout 1964." Id. at 246; see generally NELSON W. POLSBY &
ARRON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIES OF
AMERICAN ELECTORAL POLITICS 7-8, 204-05 (7th ed. 1988) (describing the Vietnam War
as a major issue in Presidential campaigns during the 1960s).
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influence in world politics. '95 "The breakdown of detente, the
steady growth of Soviet power, and the use of that power in
Afghanistan produced a heightened concern for American
security. The defense budget soared to record proportions in the
early 1980s and support for military intervention in defense of
traditional allies increased significantly. '96
B. The Unpredictable Flow of Refugees After the End of the
Vietnam War
The United States' withdrawal from Vietnam left the region in
a state of social chaos. '97 The large Southeast Asian immigration
following the Vietnam War could not have been anticipated.19'
Before 1975, Vietnamese immigration was small.' 9 Between 1966
and 1975, 20,038 Vietnamese arrived in the United States." ° When
United States military troops evacuated Vietnam after the fall of
Saigon in 1975, the number of Vietnamese Americans was
negligible, 2°' but the collapse of the South Vietnamese government
in April 1975 caused a mass exodus from Vietnam."' Shortly
thereafter, in 1975, Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge,
installed himself in power in Cambodia and began a program of
systematic genocide of the Cambodian people. 0 3 Close to two
million Cambodians were killed in his Year Zero campaign and
hundreds of thousands more were tortured and terrorized."°
Southeast Asian refugees fled their countries in different
195 HERRING, supra note 181, at 275-76.
196 Id. at 276.
197 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTS., THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF AMERICANS OF
ASIAN DESCENT: AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION 26 (1988).
198 Chin, supra note 63, at 308.
199 U.S. COMM'NON CIVIL RTS., supra note 197, at 26.
200 Id.
201 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVILRTS., supra note 133, at 34.
202 Id.; see also Minh-Duc T. Le, Note, ROVR: Resettlement Opportunities for
Vietnamese Returnees or Refoulement of Vietnamese Refugees?, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
125, 126 ("The fall of Saigon in the spring of 1975 triggered the flow of refugees from
Vietnam.").
203 Le, supra note 202, at 126; see also STANLEY KARNOW, VIETNAM: A HISTORY
55-56 (1997).
204 Le, supra note 202, at 126; see KARNOW, supra note 203, at 55-56.
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waves."5 The "first wave" of Vietnamese refugees arrived at the
United States mainland by 1977.206 The "second wave" was
comprised of small groups that often left Vietnam in fishing
boats °.2 7 A massive increase of refugees beginning in late 1978 was
triggered by: (1) the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, which
ended three years of Khmer Rouge rule; (2) the subsequent border
warfare between Vietnam and China in early 1979; (3) a new
guerilla war in the Cambodian countryside, already devastated by
famine and the destruction of the country's infrastructure; and (4)
the collapse of the Chao Pa guerilla resistance against the Pathet
Lao and the new system of collective agriculture in Laos,
compounded by mismanagement and natural catastrophe."°
In 1975, during the onset of a recession,"9 President Ford felt
205 Min Zhou & James V. Gatewood, Introduction, in CONTEMPORARY ASIAN
AMERICA: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY READER 1, 11 [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY ASIAN
AMERICA] (Min Zhou & James V. Gatewood eds., 2000).
206 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTS., RECENT ACTIVITIES AGAINST CITIZENS AND
RESIDENTS OF ASIAN DESCENT, 34 (1987); Zhou & Gatewood, supra note 205, at 11
(asserting that, in 1975, only the Vietnamese and a small number of the Hmong
resistance force had the privilege of being "paroled" into the U.S. immediately after the
war). "Approximately 130,000 Vietnamese refugees and only 3,500 Hmong refugees
landed on U.S. soil in 1975, while the majority of Hmong resistance forces, Laotian
royalists, and Cambodians sought refuge in Thailand." Id.
207 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTS., supra note 133, at 34.
The refugee exodus was shaped by complex political and economic factors....
The first waves of Indochinese refugees were disproportionately composed of
elites who left because of ideological and political opposition to the new
regimes, whereas later flows included masses of people of more modest
backgrounds fleeing regional conflicts and deteriorating economic conditions.
Ruben G. Fumbaut, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian Americans, in
CONTEMPORARY ASIAN AMERICA, supra note 205, at 178; see also Zhou & Gatewood,
supra note 205, at 11 (stating that a large refugee exodus occurred at the end of the
1970s during what is known as the "second wave," when thousands of refugees fled
Vietnam by boat, creating the "boat people" crisis, while many others fled by land to
China and Thailand).
It was reported that almost half of the "boat people" perished at sea, and the
remaining half ended up in camps in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Thousands of refugees also fled Laos and
Kampuchea (formerly Cambodia) on land to seek refuge in crowded camps
along the Thai border.
Id. at 11-12.
208 Fumbaut, supra note 207, at 178-79.
209 Louis W. KOENIG, THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 262 (5th ed. 1986).
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strongly about the responsibility of the United States and insisted
that the "United States could not desert the Vietnamese. '21 ° On
April 18, 1975, President Ford established a temporary
Interagency Task Force (IATF) to coordinate the activities of
federal agencies, including the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare and their responses to the resettlement of the
increasingly large influx of Southeast Asians.21' At the time of this
refugee flood into the United States, there was no established legal
mechanism for admitting the refugees. 21 2 The pre-1980 law
permitted only 17,400 refugee admissions annually, a number
inadequate for the situation.21 ' The "annual arrivals of Southeast
Asian refugees increased almost exponentially: 20,400 in 1978,
80,700 in 1979, and 166,700 in 1980. ""2' All in all, from 1975
through 1979, at least ten separate paroles, each limited in duration
and number and overwhelmed by the following crisis, were used
to admit over 300,000 Indochinese refugees.2"
During the early 1970s, few complaints existed about refugee
policies and laws that were registered on Congressional floors.216
However, many members of Congress wanted to limit the numbers
of Vietnamese, "fearing the rumor that Ford wanted to evacuate a
210 VALERIE O'CONNOR SUTrER, THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE DILEMMA 167 (1990)
(quoting FRANK SNEPP, DECENT INTERVAL: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF SAIGON'S
INDECENT END 412-13 (1977)).
211 HING, supra note 152, at 128. "In the spring of 1975, when the country was
suddenly faced with unprecedented numbers of Indochinese refugees, the Administration
and Congress formulated policies and enacted laws, respectively, in an attempt to
develop a systematic Indochinese refugee resettlement program." Katherine Tonnas,
Comment, Out of a Far Country: The Sojourn of Cubans, Vietnamese, Haitians, and
Chinese to America, 20 S.U. L. REv. 295, 359 (1993).
212 HING, supra note 152, at 126.
213 Id. at 125; see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 159, at 183 (describing the
Indochinese refugee problem as "intractable").
214 HING, supra note 152, at 126; see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTS., supra note
133, at 23 (stating that Indochinese refugees contributed to the recent growth of Asians
in America). "Under special legislation for refugees, sizable numbers of Vietnamese,
Cambodian, and Laotian refugees have resettled in the United States, and the largest
groups of Indochinese refugees come from Vietnam." Id.
215 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTS., supra note 197, at 23 (stating that hundreds of
thousands more would come from this region during the 1980s).
216 HING, supra note 152, at 125.
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million refugees."2 7 As an initial matter, Congress, though
unenthusiastic about the massive migration, felt no strong
domestic pressure to buck the Executive Branch in order to limit
the influx, especially after the world press began recording the
plight of the "boat people.
' 218
Professor Bill Ong Hing strongly asserts that:
Policymakers showed every sign through the early 1970s of
being pleased by their system of policies, laws, and ad hoc
decisions. As they saw it, whenever large numbers of deserving
refugees appeared, new legislation could be enacted or existing
laws and regulations manipulated. That sort of flexibility in a
legal regime was, to their minds, to be unashamedly admired . 9
These policymakers seemed satisfied with the status quo of the
greater numbers seeking refugee status from abroad.2 "Rather
than being disingenuous, this attitude was entirely consistent with
their sense of humanitarianism.
'2
'
Congress was well aware of the Vietnamese refugee crisis. As
the world's attention was placed on the plight of the boat people,"22
the upsurge in Asian entrants that started in the mid-1970s caused
policymakers dissatisfaction and serious concern. 3 In fact, the
continual admission of refugees from Vietnam created great
concern and resulted in a negative reaction to Southeast Asians,
which was reflected in the United States' refugee policy.' After
1975, policymakers became less patient as Asians began entering
in increasing numbers under existing guidelines. Bill Ong Hing
states that:
217 SUTTER, supra note 210, at 167.
218 GILL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND
AMERICA' S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 122-23 (1986).
219 HING, supra note 152, at 124.
220 Id. at 125.
221 Id.
222 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 31.
223 Id.; see also Paul Ong & Evelyn Blumenberg, Welfare and Work Among
Southeast Asians, in THE STATE OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICA: ECONOMIC DIVERSITY,
ISSUES & POLICIES 116 (Paul Ong ed., 1994) (stating that "the influx of Southeast Asians
to the United States was thought to be a short-term phenomenon, the immediate
consequence of the violent communist takeover that occurred in Vietnam in 1975.
However, contrary to expectations, the flow of refugees did not wane").
224 HING, supra note 93, at 27.
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Initially, the United States merely wanted to evacuate fewer than
20,000 American dependents and government employees.
However, to involve numerical restrictions in the midst of a
controversial and devastating war would have been
unconscionable, and evacuees soon also included former
employees, some 4,000 orphans, 75,000 relatives of American
citizens and residents, and 50,000 Vietnamese government
employees and officials. Between April and December 1975, the
United States thus admitted 130,400 Southeast Asian refugees,
125,000 of whom were Vietnamese. 25
The Indochinese refugees became the topic of public debate.
An overwhelming majority of Americans disfavored any further
assistance in evacuating Vietnamese.226 This great anti-Vietnamese
sentiment amongst the general public was mirrored in the
generally restrictionist attitudes of interested congressional
committees.2 The traditional restrictionist attitude was prevalent
among some members of Congress and mainstream American
society. 8 Public opinion polls voiced opposition to American
rescue initiatives and demonstrated the rampant fears, especially
among African Americans and the poor, that any infusion of
refugees would exacerbate the severe unemployment problem.29
These sentiments were juxtaposed against the international
community's perception that the evacuation from Vietnam was an
apt conclusion to the United States' fiasco in Vietnam and the
refugees who were escaping Indochina were America's
unassignable responsibility. 30 In the face of overwhelming public
desire to turn away and end the "Vietnam problem ' 231' and its tragic
225 Id.
226 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 130.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 109. Cf. Kathryn M. Bockley, supra note 110, at 276.
The United States' attempt to provide assistance to the Vietnamese refugee
population stemmed from political sympathy to the former Vietnamese allies
who had fought with the United States in support of the Nguyen Van Thieu
regime. Many Americans felt a sense of obligation to a people that the United
States had supported and then abandoned.
Id.
231 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 121.
2001]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
legacy of American involvement, President Ford declared in a
television interview that the United States had a real obligation to
evacuate large numbers of South Vietnamese. 32
In 1976, the sheer magnitude of the exodus and the
resettlement effort for over 130,000 refugees evacuated from
Indochina made parole the only feasible method for their
admission.33 The use of the parole authority as a vehicle for
Indochinese admission reflected the inadequacies of the ad hoc
procedures. With reference to the poorly coordinated flow of
Southeast Asians, Bill Ong Hing remarks:
The executive branch repeatedly waited until the number of
refugees in countries of "first asylum" (those first reached by
refugees) reached crisis proportions before declaring an
emergency. Only then would a new parole program be
instituted. Attacks on the inconsistent treatment of refugees and
calls for a consistent policy became commonplace. Many were
uncomfortable with the attorney general's considerable
unstructured power to hastily admit tens of thousands of
refugees under the parole mechanism. Others were genuinely
concerned with the government's erratic response to the plight
of Southeast Asian refugees.3
The parole process involved considerable concentration of
power in the Chairman and ranking minority members of both
House and Senate Judiciary Committees and the key members of
the refugee subcommittees.3 The key decision-makers in the
232 Id. at 110; see also Daniel P. Moynihan, The Presidency & the Press,
Commentary, Mar. 1971, at 41 (commenting on the President's near limitless capacity to
"make" news and influence the national press agenda).
[Television] affects not only the timing of major policy decisions but their
substance as well. A TV news lead item hits reviewers with the speed and force
of a laser beam, and it attracts the interest of a much wider audience than the
permitted word. It therefore can speed the coalescence of public backing for an
initiative the president favors but is reluctant to take before the public is ready
to support it.
Id.; see also Lloyd N. Cutler, Foreign Policy on Deadline, 56 FOREIGN POL'Y 115
(1984).
233 See Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 30; see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note
159, at 280 (characterizing the Indochina exodus and automatic resettlement regardless
of refugee status as unique).
234 HING, supra note 152, at 27; see also Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 30.
235 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 123.
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Senate were Strom Thurmond, James Eastland, and Edward
Kennedy, and their counterparts in the House were Judiciary
Chairman Peter Rodino, Joshua Eilberg, and Hamilton Fish.236
The issue was as much legal as political. By 1978, thousands
of additional refugees were admitted through a series of
Indochinese Parole Programs authorized by the Attorney General.
Bill Ong Hing suggests that "[i]nvoking numerical restrictions [in
response to the increased flow of Asian refugees] in the midst of a
controversial and devastating war would have been unacceptable;
too many understood such inflexibility as morally treacherous and
politically high-priced. Consequently, the Attorney General on
several occasions used the parole authority to permit Asians to
enter-the first time it was employed since the 1965
amendments.,
237
Throughout the 1970s, congressional committees had
expressed growing frustration with how the Executive Branch
handled the "spasmodic" and uncontrolled refugee flows.
28
Several hundred thousand boat people and many Cambodian and
Laotian refugees entered soon after due to the further expansion by
the Vietnamese into Cambodia.3 Mainstream American society
then realized that controls were desperately needed to curb the
refugee burden.
In 1975, during the onset of a recession,2"° President Ford felt
strongly about the responsibility and insisted that the "United
States could not desert the Vietnamese., 2' Congress was
concerned about the apparent "unlimited authority" of the
Attorney General. 212 "The pressures of the Indochina refugee
emergency prompted congressional action on a more equitable and
regulated refugee program, which resulted in the Refugee Act of
1980."2"3 "The Refugee Act interpreted by the State Department
236 Id.
237 HING, supra note 152, at 125-26.
238 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 115-17.
239 HING, supra note 93, at 28.
240 KOENIG, supra note 209, at 262.
241 SJTTER, supra note 210, at 167 (quoting SNEPP, supra note 210, at 412-13).
242 Id. at 168.
243 Id.
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appeared to some to emphasize foreign policy goals unduly."' "
"The growing perception that American refugee policy was
responding to the Indochina refugee crisis primarily for foreign
policy reasons forced a confrontation between the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) and the State Department
concerning authority over refugee admissions."2 5  The
assertiveness of the INS toward the Indochinese refugees may
reflect its efforts "to compensate for its poor performance in
controlling illegal entry, especially along the Mexican border.
246
INS officer Jack Fortner believed that his agency was the
"necessary brake" to the admission of refugees to the United
States.4 7 He stated that "if the State Department was given the
reins, there would be no stopping the refugee flow. 2 48 Also,
according to Fortner, "the American government's complex and
bureaucratic refugee program, 'feeds a huge conveyor belt' of
voluntary agencies that assist the refugees. 2 9
C. Resettlement: Nativism Against Indochinese Refugees
The resettlement assistance for refugees was increased when
the Refugee Act was adopted in 1980.250 The Act authorized a
resettlement assistance program to last for three years.251 During
that period, the agencies that managed the reception and settlement
244 Id. at 169.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 185.
247 Id. at 172.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTS., supra note 133, at 20.
251 Id.
One of the major goals of the Federal Settlement Program was to spread the
economic and social impact of the refugees as evenly as possible throughout the
nation. Conventional adaptation theory holds that a geographic distribution
which reduces contact among members of an immigrant group, while promoting
maximum contact between the immigrants and native-born Americans, tends to
stimulate economic and cultural adaptation.
Id. (quoting Jacqueline Desbarats and Linda Holland, Indochinese Settlement Patterns in
Orange County, AM. J., vol. 10, at 23-24 (Spring/Summer 1983)). These beliefs inspired
the Federal Government in 1982 to require settlement agencies to place refugees in areas
without large numbers of previous arrivals. Id.
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of new refugees were allocated funds for the necessities of the
incoming refugees in the form of clothing, housing, food, English
language instruction, and job training. '52 Notwithstanding the well-
meaning intent of the program, the federally funded program
proved problematic from the outset.253 Among the litany of issues
was its lack of consideration for the long-term effects on the
refugee communities and the manner in which the refugees were
summarily dispersed to various parts of the country."'
Although the IATF hoped to ease the refugees' transition into
mainstream American culture by monitoring and manipulating
them, the plan failed miserably.255 Primarily due to the difficulties
of monitoring the communities and the unintentional creation of
opportunities for refugees to communicate with and reinforce each
other, the communities formed alliances to mobilize and resettle
elsewhere through secondary migration. "6
1. Refugee Life and the Negative Socioeconomic Impact
on American Communities
Almost immediately, there was a negative reaction to
Vietnamese refugees. 7 Unquestionably, the refugees have had an
impact on the economy, jobs, wage scales, and neighborhood
character in many parts of the nation." California had the largest
252 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 115-17.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Kevin Johnson states that:
A recurring theme in U.S. history is that new immigrants, like welfare
recipients, are disfavored by the voting public. Consistent with a historical cycle
of nativism roughly correlated with the ups-and-downs of a market economy,
immigrants, particularly ones who enter or remain in the United States in
contravention of the law, have grown increasingly unpopular in recent years.
Johnson, supra note 92, at 1511.
258 SUCHENG CHANG, ASIAN AMERICANS: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY 100 (1991);
see also Craig Trinh-Phat Huynh, Vietnamese-Owned Manicure Business in LosAngeles,
in Tim STATE OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICA: REFRAMING THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE 201
(Bill Ong Hing & Ronald Lee eds., 1996).
Vietnamese domination of the business and their competitive prices have
created resentment among some non-Vietnamese nail salon owners who decry
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refugee population, and Texas had the second-largest refugee
population. "9 A large number of refugees were relocated to
Pennsylvania, and about 40% of the Hmong population in the
United States resettled in Minnesota.2 ' From the beginning of
1981, it became apparent that most of the recent Indochinese
arrivals were finding it difficult, if not impossible, to adjust to
American life.26' Added to their difficulties was the unfavorable
attitude that many Americans had towards these refugees entering
their neighborhoods. 62 A poll of attitudes of Americans in nine
cities towards refugees showed that many had a negative feeling
about them.263 This poll revealed that 47% of those surveyed
believed that "Indochinese refugees take jobs away from others in
my area. ' 264 Moreover, "[o]nly 21 percent of those surveyed
believed that Indochinese refugees should be encouraged to move
into their community. 265 Sucheng Chang asserts that many
taxpayers deeply resent the continual extension of public
assistance given to the very people whom, just a short while ago,
American military troops were indoctrinated to hate and to kill
immediately. 266 Also, the efforts on the part of voluntary refugees
to get Vietnamese jobs and to become self-sufficient often
conflicted with the interests of other minority groups.267
"Unlike the earlier flows of refugees from Eastern Europe and
Cuba ... few of the new arrivals had significant formal education,
professional and occupational skills relevant to an industrial
the lowering of prices to just one-third of what they were a decade ago. Many
Vietnamese manicurists, however, counter that this trend has simply made nail
services more affordable for more customers.
Id.
259 CHANG, supra note 258, at 161.
260 Id.
261 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 167.
262 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTs., supra note 133, at 36 (reporting of study conducted
by Paul D. Starr and Alden Roberts, Attitudes Toward New Americans: Perceptions of
Indo-Chinese in Nine Cities, Research in Race and Ethnic Relations, vol. 3, 175 tbl.1
(1982).
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 37.
266 CHANG, supra note 258, at 164.
267 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTS., supra note 133, at 36-38.
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society or familiarity with the English language and the American
way of life." '268 These refugees faced tremendous social and
economic hurdles. 69 In this new and often hostile land, Southeast
Asians were deprived of necessary familiar, cultural, and ethnic
support. 7° In addition, due to the lack of governmental support,
families often ended up separated and divided.27'
These conditions created fertile ground for the growth and
spread of anti-Asian sentiment that was "aggravated by the
increased visibility of Asian Americans due to a large influx of
immigrants and refugees from Asia.' '272 According to Bill Ong
Hing:
By 1980, 45 percent of the first wave of Southeast Asian
refugees had moved from their assigned locations to a different
state, thereby frustrating the dispersal policy's goals of
minimizing the impact of refugees on local economies. They
became concentrated most heavily in California, Texas, and
Louisiana. Urban areas having warm climates and an Asian
268 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 167. Refugees "had little money and
few job skills related to work in an industrialized society. They settled in low-income
neighborhoods, [took] low-paying jobs when available, and [were] otherwise eligible for
public assistance. This made them competitors with low-income Americans for the same
resources." U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTS., supra note 133, at 36.
269 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTs., supra note 133, at 36. At this time, "[tihe United
States has resettled more Indochinese refugees than any other country, continues to
pledge large quotas for resettlement ... and funds all refugee programs in the amount of
over $794 million annually in federal monies, plus millions more at the state and local
levels." STrrTER, supra note 210, at 166-67.
270 HING, supra note 152, at 132-33.
271, Id. "The refugee experience is a major cause of the lower social and economic
indicators among Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, and Hmong immigrants. Along with
language and cultural differences, wartime traumas, forced uprooting, relocation, and
resettlement make the incorporation of Southeast Asian refugee populations into
American society especially challenging and complex." ANCHETA, supra note 49, at 133.
272 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTS., CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES FACING ASIAN AMERICANS IN
THE 1990s 23 (1992).
[Because] Asian Americans are heavily concentrated geographically, the
increase in the Asian population in some communities has been much more
dramatic. For example, in Lowell, Massachusetts, the Cambodian population
increased from a negligible percentage to roughly 25 percent of the population
after 1980s. Many California communities have been similarly affected by
Asian immigration.
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population were preferred. . . . By the time the -second wave
began arriving in 1978, Southeast Asian refugees, particularly
the Vietnamese, were no longer as widely dispersed as they had
been under the original plan .... Housing shortages, perceived
job competition, and high welfare dependency became
associated with many of these resettlement areas, only fueling
hostility and resentment.273
This newfound xenophobia was ubiquitous. Almost
immediately, "[f]ear and hostility toward 'foreigners' erupted. 274
Inevitable conflicts arose. 75 Though an influencing factor may
have been the fact that refugees were recipients of public
assistance, a more important facet was "the fact that refugee
children, because of their lack of English and need for remedial
instruction, put heavy strains on the local schools." '276
Oftentimes, "hardworking Indochinese adults were resented
... because they competed with their American counterparts for
increasingly scarce employment." 77 The strife over employment
and housing was not limited to conflicts between whites and
Asians, but between racial minority communities and Asians as
well. Latinos, who found it especially difficult to compete with the
Indochinese, voiced particular concerns.278 Finally, the intense
273 HING, supra note 152, at 130. Gill Loescher and John Scanlan assert that:
Concern mounted over the increasing size of local refugee welfare budgets,
inequities in the distribution system which allowed certain refugees to receive
more benefits than other welfare recipients, the lengthening time many refugees
appeared to spend on welfare, and the impact they had on housing, employment,
education, and public health services.
LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 202.
274 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 167.
275 Id.; see also Penelope McMillan, Fact-Finding Project Began Anti-Asian
Bigotry: An 'Alarming' Rise as Refugees Pour In, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1995 at 1
(reporting that "[the] Racial Violence Monitoring Project" was established in response to
antagonism, bigotry, and violence against Indochinese refugees in Southern California).
276 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 167.
277 Id. "The factors that may contribute to anti-Asian sentiment in the United States
include increasing numbers of persons of Asian origins and their changing demographic
patterns, problems in the resettlement process for refugees, and competition between
low-income refugees and other low-income groups for jobs and housing." U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RTs., supra note 133, at 39.
278 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 202. Kevin Johnson refers to the
racial dynamics of immigration, which have complicated the debate over civil rights.
This is evident in minority citizens, particularly African Americans who "have long
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dislike of the refugees culminated in racially motivated behavior
against persons of Asian descent as a result of general anti-Asian
sentiment exacerbated by misperceptions about Asians and their
characteristics.279 Not uncommon were incidents of racially
motivated violence against these refugees. 8 °
The Vietnamese encountered hostility in areas where there was
high unemployment or there was a housing shortage. 81 "In Maine,
unemployed young people occasionally roughed up and robbed the
Vietnamese." '82 Similarly, "when Vietnamese shrimp fishermen
were moved to Galveston, Texas, they were perceived as a threat
to the livelihood of local fishermen and were terrorized by
members of the Ku Klux Klan. '83 One commentator provided an
example that typifies the hate targeted against Indochinese
refugees: "[t]wo Cambodian residents [were] assaulted by
Vietnam veterans 'who were angry that Vietnamese were coming
to this country and buying new cars.' When told that their victims
were Cambodians, not Vietnamese, the assailants retorted, 'it's the
complained that immigrants and refugees displace them in the job market." Johnson,
supra note 90, at 181.
279 U.S. COMM'NON CIVIL RTS., supra note 133, at 31.
280 ANCHETA, supra note 49, at 73-74. According to Angelo Ancheta, the foreigner
racialization and "the racialization of Asian Americans as 'enemies' can stretch beyond
periods of actual war." Id. He suggests that:
Military propaganda that portrays wartime enemies in racial terms becomes part
of the racialization process that subordinates Americans of Asian ancestry.
Examples include the popular use of the term "japs" during World War II or the
vulgar use of the term "gooks" during the Vietnam War. The racial learning that
is reinforced through military propaganda can extend long after military
activities have ceased. Aggregated military conflicts with Japan during World
War II, with China and North Korea during the Korean War, and with North
Vietnam during the Vietnam War have bred aggression and hostility against
Asians and Asian Americans that persist even today. And when contemporary
political rhetoric concerning "trade wars," "drug wars," or the "war on illegal
immigration" is used, Asian Americans are among the first to suffer.
Id.; see also Andrew M. Gilbert & Eric D. Marchand, Note, Splitting the Atom or
Splitting Hairs-The Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 931, 940-
50 (1999) (detailing the great prevalence of racially motivated violence and crimes
targeting minority individuals, including Asian immigrants, with current raw statistical
data and analysis).
281 LOESCHER& SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 116.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 117.
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same thing."'284 This anti-Vietnamese violence was not limited to
white against Asian violence. In Denver, Mexican-Americans
reacted violently when Indochinese families were given preference
over them in a housing project that had a long waiting list.28
2. Orange County, California: A Case Study
Though race has been the prime factor in early immigration
conflicts in California, labor relations and class have served, over
time, as major influences as well.286 Nativism against Asians was
resurrected and reinvigorated as the Indochinese began arriving in
what were previously cozy, quiet, and largely white
neighborhoods in California.287 These communities were especially
burdened by the refugee resettlement.288 "[A]lthough a lower
proportion of initial placements of refugees have been made in
California relative to earlier years, secondary migration has
increased the proportion of refugees ultimately settling there.
2 89
According to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, "California
has the largest population of Indochinese refugees with 40 percent
of Southeast Asian refugees living there. About 73 percent reside
in the 10 States with the largest numbers of refugees."' 9 In the
early 1980s, communities where refugees settled in large numbers
became uneasy. 9 Orange County was no different.292 Between
284 Jerry Kang, Note, Racial Violence Against Asian Americans, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1926, 1939 (1993) (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 133, which quotes
from a complaint filed in Commonwealth v. Coderre, No. 63506 (Super. Ct. Mass.
1983)).
285 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 116.
286 Delgado & Stefanic, supra note 148, at 1532.
287 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTs., supra note 133, at 20.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 201-02.
292 Id. at 202; see also Jim Cooper, Orange County Voices Immigration, L.A.
TIMES, May 3, 1990, at 11:
The number of Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian refugees throughout the
Nation has since grown to 1 million. Orange County with one-percent of the
national population, is now home to ten-percent of all the nation's Indochinese
refugees. It is estimated that Orange County has 100,000 Vietnamese, 8,000
Cambodians and 3,000 Laotians.
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1975 and 1982, 60,000 Indochinese settled there, representing
about one-ninth of the Indochinese then resettled in the United
States.293
The refugees were drawn to the Golden State "by good
weather and favorable employment opportunities, by welfare and
social services generous by national standards, and by a desire to
rejoin family and friends., 294 However, the transition was far from
smooth.29 For instance, the refugees "overloaded the public
schools and medical facilities and were blamed for a rise in the
rate of tuberculosis and other diseases.
'296
The concerned citizens of Orange County found a spokesman
293 Id.; see also Pyong Gap Min, Introduction, in ASIAN AMERICANS:
CONTEMPORARY TENDS AND ISSUES (Pyong Gap Min ed., 1995):
Indochinese refugees have established several ethnic enclaves in Orange
County. About half of Orange County Indochinese refugees reside in Santa
Ana, Garden Grove, and Westminster, their largest enclave. In 1988, the area
along Bolsa Avenue from Magnolia to Bushard was officially designated "Little
Saigon" by the City Council of Westminster.
294 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 202; see also Ong & Blumenberg,
supra note 223, at 122 (stating that "[t]he decline of federal assistance has not translated
into a decline by refugees in the reliance on welfare. Instead, refugees have shifted to
regular public aid programs"). Ong and Blumenberg also report that:
A 1992 survey shows that two-thirds of Southeast Asian households that
entered the U.S. in 1985 still relied, wholly or partly, on public assistance. This
is roughly the same usage rate among refugees who arrived in the 1990s. Since
most of these refugees did not qualify for federal grants, their payments came
primarily from state-operated and funded programs. The only thing that the
change in federal policy has accomplished is to shift the refugees into the
welfare system more rapidly.
Id. at 122-23.
295 Hieu Tran Phan, Escaping From Welfare; Vietnamese Refugees Face Cultural
Obstacles in Search for Work, ORANGE CouNTY REG., Aug. 16, 1998, at Al (describing
contemporary social and economic difficulties facing Vietnamese refugees in their
resettlement efforts, which reflect the same issues encountered by Indochinese refugees
during the 1970s and 1980s). Orange County Supervisor Cynthia P. Coad recalls her
work in helping the Indochinese refugee population: "There was a large influx of
Indochinese refugees after 1979. They needed help with language training, with basic
skills of how to interview for a job and [with] job skills... as machinists or computer
operators." Statement available at httplH:www/oc.ca.gov/supes/fourthlcoadarticle.htm
(last visited Jan. 28, 2001).
296 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 202; see also Kenneth F. Bunting,
Competing Bills Could Aid 2 County School Districts, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1995, at 12
(stating that the influx of Indochinese refugees is responsible for the need for substantial
increases in educational funds for the school systems).
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in Representative Daniel Lungren, who led efforts at the state and
local levels to reform the welfare system.297 Lungren, "a
Republican who represented the most heavily impacted area,
sought unsuccessfully to obtain more federal aid."'298 With a
reputation as a hard-liner in Congress, Lungren was known to give
angry and vociferous speeches on the floor of the House.299 Along
with other Orange County elected public officials, Lungren
pleaded with the Reagan Administration that the local
communities could not easily handle any more refugees and
insisted that the federal government take the necessary steps to
keep them away."
The economic situation in California has been used to foment
anti-immigrant hysteria. During the early 1980s, the state endured
a monumental fiscal crisis.3"' Throughout this period a severe
budget deficit persisted, and these economic concerns were
bolstered by anti-immigrant sentiment.0 2 California Governor
Deukmajian added a good deal of fuel to the fire in 1983 by
blaming many of the state's fiscal woes on Vietnamese refugees.3
In Deukmejian's Economic Report, he revealed that "[o]f special
interest are the Southeast Asian refugees from Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos. Over one-third of those coming to the United
297 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 202. Lungren also supported the 1996
California Civil Rights Initiative, which is a state-wide ban of all racial, ethnic, and
gender-based preferences in state employment, education, and contracting in the history
of affirmative action. LYDIA CHAVEZ, THE COLORBIND: CALIFORNIA'S BATTLE TO END
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 2, 68 (1998).
298 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 202. Recent Indochinese refugees
were more likely to be poor and on welfare than any other ethnic group in America.
David Whitman, Asian Un-Success Stories, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1987, at Cl.
299 Dirk Olin, Lungren's the One: He's Tan, He's Rested, He's Ready to Bring
Nixonian Politics Back to California, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1993, 50-51. Dan Lungren also
"voted against reparations for interned Japanese Americans, fought the creation of a
Martin Luther King Jr. holiday.., and averaged a support rate of more than 80 percent
for Ronald Reagan's legislative agenda." Id. at 51.
300 Id.
301 GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR 25-27 (1983).
302 Lynn H. Fujiwara, The Impact of Welfare Reform on Asian Immigrant
Communities, Soc. JUST., Mar. 22, 1998, at 82 (describing anti-immigrant hysteria
caused by the arrival of refugees from Asia between 1980 and 1990).
303 DEUKMEJIAN, supra note 301, at 25.
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States settle in California."3 "
An equally important element in the anti-refugee crusade was
the doubt that Southeast Asians could successfully assimilate into
American society."' The assumption that the Vietnamese were an
infusible element seemed to trouble melting-pot assimilationists
and more extreme supporters of Anglo-conformity. 6
"At a congressional hearing in late 1981, a county official
from Iowa spoke of the adverse impact federal cuts in domestic
programs [had] on local refugee resettlement."3 7 Similarly, a 1983
California delegation report indicated that "U.S. resettlement was
subordinate to many other American foreign policy objectives.' °30 8
"The report was also highly critical of the refugees' dependence
on public assistance. ' 3 9 Paul J. Strand and Woodrow Jones, Jr.
emphasized the fact that the Indochinese refugee was different
from an immigrant to the United States.310 They suggested that
"[e]mployment and self-sufficiency are particularly troublesome
issues for the Indochinese refugees ... as they do not come to the
U.S. to market skills that are supported by the U.S. economy. They
came to escape persecution. ' '"" Governor Deukmejian remarked:
Due to continued high foreign immigration, and the high fertility
rates of some of these immigrants, the racial/ethnic composition
of the State's population will continue to change in the coming
decade.... The Southeast Asian refugees ... have an English
language difficulty and are economically and educationally
disadvantaged. Their need for social and educational assistance
304 Id.
305 "[M]any Americans misunderstand the status of refugees in this country ...
[leading to] feelings of mistrust and resentment." U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTS., supra
note 133, at 34.
306 "Cultural differences between Americans and recent arrivals also lead to anti-
Asian sentiment. Americans unfamiliar with the practices misinterpret certain customs of
refugees. Refugees... may not be aware of American customs or laws, and may do
things that violate either local ordinances or rules of conduct found acceptable by
Americans." Id. at 36.
307 SUTrER, supra note 210, at 180.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id.
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can therefore be expected to continue.
Orange County's elected public officials expressed sentiments
that it would be difficult for local communities to handle any more
refugees.1 3 Representatives from Colorado and Florida, along with
a significant number of Congressmen from other states, shared
these sentiments."' In response to the deleterious effects of the
national recession, they voiced their concerns and called for
limitations to be placed on the influx of refugees.1 5
St. Paul, Minnesota ... discovered that it had become, virtually
overnight, the home of thousands of Hmong tribesman from
Laos, and Seattle, Washington, which struggled with a massive
refugee problem at the same time that it sought to survive
layoffs in the aircraft manufacturing industry. The federal
government attempted to steer new arrivals away from heavily
impacted areas but could do little to control secondary
migration.3"6
"President Ronald Reagan... responded to the problems posed by
refugees and illegal aliens by proposing a number of new
immigration plans, some more restrictive than others."3 '7 "The
Reagan Administration ... also [took] a more aggressive approach
to discourage the flow of refugees to the United States."3 '8
312 DEUKMEJIAN, supra note 301, at 27.
313 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 202. "California counties hard hit by
an influx of Indochinese refugees will receive nearly $16 million in disputed federal
aid." Bob Secter, 13 California Counties to Share $16 Million for Refugee Relief, L.A.
TIMES, July 19, 1995, at A3.
314 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 202.
315 Id.
One commonly held belief about refugees is that the United States Government
is making very low-interest loans to immigrants and refugees or giving them
money to start businesses....
Another misconception about refugees is that the government is providing
them with cash grants as a part of the resettlement process. Actually, most
refugees have little if any money and are entirely dependent upon their families
or upon the refugee resettlement agencies.
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RTS., supra note 133, at 35.
316 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 202.
317 GIL LOESCHER & ANN DULL LOESCHER, THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: A TEST OF
HUMANITY 103 (1982).
318 Id.
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Meanwhile, there were subsequent efforts to further limit the
number of refugees coming to the United States. Senator Alan
Simpson, a member of the Hesburgh Commission, believed that
immigration reform was a quagmire."9 His vantage point was
shared by other politicians at the time who interpreted reform as a
"no win issue, a lost cause, the domestic equivalent of Vietnam. ''32°
Simpson feared the economic effects of illegal immigration on
domestic workers, the creation of growing ethnic enclaves, and the
cultural deportation that it might engender among unassimilated
aliens unable to speak English. 2
Senator Simpson, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Immigration and Refugee Policy and a longtime advocate of
immigration restriction, held an avowedly strong position in
cautioning "that the Refugee Act of 1980 was intended to correct
the abuses of humanitarian parole. ' '322 He expressed the concern
some felt about the parole authority and its potential to admit large
numbers of refugees: "[I want to know] how many will come in
under humanitarian parole. I would like to have someone give me
a figure. No one does .... It was because of the parole authority of
the United States that we had to come to the Refugee Act.
3 23
Further, Simpson reported that his constituents complained when
more was provided to refugees, while cuts were being made to
government programs, food stamps, and welfare benefits for
American citizens.14 All of this in totality illustrates the strong
desire that was present to implement a solution to the refugee
crisis that plagued America in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The
panacea was in the form of the subtly titled Refugee Act of 1980.
319 SUTTER, supra note 210, at 178.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 179-80.
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VI. Legislative Efforts to Limit the Number of Indochinese
Refugees From Entering
A. The Idea for the Refugee Act and the Political Tug of War
Between the Executive and Legislative Branches
The Refugee Act was not merely the brainchild of Senator
Edward Kennedy and Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman.32 '
Rather, it represented the culmination of various attempts during
the 1970s to follow the tradition set forth with the passage of the
1965 Amendments to the INA.326 While the 1965 Amendments
represented a shift in policy, many gaps nevertheless existed. 27 To
address these gaps:
Various refugee reform provisions appeared in omnibus
immigration bills introduced through 1976 in the 94th Congress.
... These reform proposals constituted a new approach to the
definition of refugee, as well as to how, and by whom, the
admission of refugees was to be controlled. While none was
adopted into law, the evolution of these different refugee
proposals and the hearings in which they were discussed helped
to define the parameters of the debate that finally resulted in
refugee reform in 1980.328
Some members of Congress contended that the Attorney
General was using parole authority too liberally. 29 "Congress was
concerned about the apparent 'unlimited authority' of the attorney
general. 33 "The pressures of the Indochina refugee emergency
prompted congressional action on a more equitable and regulated
325 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 20.
To restore faith in our immigration policies-to establish an immigration law
that is in America's long run interests and faithful to our humanitarian
traditions-I urged in 1976 that we should follow the precedent established by
President Truman and create a high-level Commission on Immigration and
Naturalization. The work of the Truman Commission had laid the basis for the
1965 reforms, and a new commission could provide the serious and
comprehensive review of our immigration law that was so long overdue.
Kennedy, supra note 1, at 2.
326 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 20.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 SUTrER, supra note 210, at 168.
330 Id.
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refugee program, which resulted in the Refugee Act of 1980." '331
"[T]he Refugee Act as interpreted by the State Department
appeared to some to emphasize foreign policy goals unduly.""33 For
instance, "[t]he Indochinese parole program was the most dramatic
... example of the problem (at least as perceived by a number of
congressional members) of the use of the parole authority for
refugee admission." '333
During this period of perceived crisis, the Ford Administration
made an announcement for a moratorium on new parole
programs.3 "The sequence of ad hoc parole programs, the
elimination of refugee clauses from the 1976 Act ... and a pledge
by President Ford to cooperate in legislative efforts at refugee
reform, motivated a new congressional effort" to develop a
meaningful refugee law in response to the situation.3
The Refugee Act of 1980 was Congress' attempt to treat
refugee and immigration policies separately and distinctly.336 The
Act was "introduced, debated, and passed when the federal Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy was preoccupied
with other issues." '337  Initially, commission members were
presented with the Act and provided with the impression that the
refugee and immigration policies were separable.338 As such, their
work on immigration policies was to focus solely on the selection
and admission regulations while keeping an eye on their effects on
the nation's economic, social, and political well-being.339
Leading congressional efforts to limit refugee admissions was
Congressman Joshua Eilberg, the influential Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Immigration,
331 Id. at 168-69.
332 Id. at 169.
333 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 31 n.99.
334 Id. at 31.
335 Id.
336 HING, supra note 152, at 126.
337 Id.
338 Id.
319 Id. at 127. Cf. Scanlan, supra note 152, at 820 ("United States immigration law is
rooted in the fundamental premise that law can and should control the numbers and the
characteristics of individuals entering the United States.... [T]his strong interest in
controlling immigration is likely to exert special pressure on ... refugees.").
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Citizenship, and International Law.3"' Conversely, the Executive
Branch desired to obtain "autonomy in deciding the number of
refugees admitted while maintaining its ability to be politically
selective in excluding some nationalities," but at the same time
allow "extremely generous quotas for others.
34
'
President Ford's supporters included individuals who clung to
the view that parole authority allowed the United States to bring
the refugee problem under control.342 Sheppard Lowman, Hank
Cushing, and Lionel Rosenblatt, with the support of a number of
senior State Department officials, argued for the continuation of
the Admission Program for the Indochinese Refugees.343
According to Gil Loescher and John Scanlan:
Many of these people were simultaneously affected by the
misery of the Indochinese and by the geopolitical concerns
about the political future of all of Southeast Asia if the
thousands of migrants who sought protection there were not
resettled. All [of these program supporters] had previously
served in Vietnam and had personal and emotional attachments
to the country.344
"These officials were instrumental in persuading a sometime
reluctant Congress to keep immigration channels open for
Vietnamese and Laotians. '43
Powerful sponsors in the State Department often bolstered
support for the refugees. 6 For example, Philip Habib, first as
Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs and later as
Undersecretary for Political Affairs, was the most senior of the
program's supporters.347 Also, Frank Wisner, Jr., Deputy Executive
Secretary of the Department sensitized the President and the
Secretary to the Indochinese refugee crisis and the need for more
expansive admissions by screening the flow of information to the
340 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 123.
341 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 34.
342 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 123.
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id. at 124.
346 Id.
347 Id.
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Secretary of State."' Future program advocates included David
Newsome, Habib's successor as Undersecretary for Political
Affairs, and Richard Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary for East
Asian Affairs in the Carter Administration.3"9
In November 1977, Sheppard Lowman briefed Leo Cherne,
the Chairman of International Rescue Committee, on the Southeast
Asia situation.3  Cherne's personal background informed his
position. He was a supporter of the Republic of South Vietnam, as
well as a staunch anti-Communist "hard-liner" who led most
postwar refugee efforts." ' Without doubt, political and
humanitarian interests motivated Cherne and many State
Department officials who advocated for the entry of refugees from
the Communist countries of Indochina. "2 In his large and more
ambitious projects, Cherne wanted, through a public relations
program coupled with coalition-building efforts, to build broad
public, congressional, and Executive support for a large
Indochinese Refugee Program.353
Situated on the other side of the issue, Congressman Eilberg
led the opposition, resisting the reopening of America's borders on
the grounds that the Vietnamese could not easily assimilate into
American society. 5' In Eilberg's mind, "the widespread use of
parole undercut the basic principles of American immigration
law."3  Interestingly, Eilberg's subcommittee was closely linked
with labor unions that were concerned that refugees would
represent great competition in an already depressed economy.356
The following exchange typifies the banter back and forth on
the issue of the refugee flow: Congressman Joshua Eilberg stated,
"I am... concerned with how long the compassion and patience
of the American people will continue, as we come in with these
348 Id.
349 Id.
350 Id. at 129.
311 Id. at 130.
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 Id. at 123.
355 Id. Peter Brimelow shares a similar view, believing that the American nation has
always had a specific "white" ethnic core. BRIMELOW, supra note 64, at 10.
356 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 133.
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continued requests on an ad hoc basis, ' .7 while Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Philip Habib stated,
"[t]he parole would 'clean up' the region of refugees, this would
be [the] State's final request and [President Ford] would not come
back to Congress for an increase in parole authority in this
category. ' '9358
These discussions were commonplace and reflected the intense
dissatisfaction with the continued use of the Executive Parole by
the Ford Administration in admitting refugees.359 Edward Kennedy,
as chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, seemed
to represent the small middle ground. In fact, he was largely
responsible for steering the Refugee Act of 1980 through
Congress."6 At another level, there was also conflict involving
competition between the two branches for control over decision-
making policy.
316
Bill Ong Hing suggests that the disturbing anxiety felt by some
members of Congress that thousands of Southeast Asians would
eventually destabilize many communities was a major catalyst for
the Refugee Act. 62 According to Phillip N. Hawkes, former
director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, over half of the
refugees who have been in the United States for three years or less
"are on public assistance. 363
Yet at the same time, many witnesses and legislators
recognized that existing law was unfair to the Vietnamese
351 Id. at 124.
358 Id.
359 Id.
360 SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 104. Kennedy favored a liberalized immigration and
refugee policy. According to Schuck, "[Kennedy] considered himself, and was viewed
by others, as continuing his brother Robert's leadership of the ethnic-civil rights
coalition in the Senate. Kennedy's liberalizing agenda, although sometimes constrained
by his close ties to organized labor and the Hispanic caucus's abhorrence of sanctions,
was hardly surprising." Id.
361 Id.
362 HING, supra note 152, at 127; see also S13713, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Vote 309
(1988) (examining the legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980 and recalling,
during that time period, Senate members contended that the plight of the Southeast
Asians was an economic one and not a refugee problem).
363 SUTTER, supra note 210, at 178.
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refugees.3" Civil rights leader Bayard Rustin argued that a refugee
rescue policy had the support of the African American community
and downplayed the notion that refugees would take jobs away
from the poor. 65 Rustin suggested that "[m]ost Americans will not
...take the ...ill paying and dirty work that many of these
refugees will take as they start the upward path to mobility, as all
of us in the past, wherever we come from, had to take.
3 66
B. The Indochinese Parole Program and the 1977 Hearings
on the Admission of Refugees
A close examination of the legislative history reveals that the
passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 was essentially a legislative
battle between Congress and the Executive Branch, which was led
by the Carter Administration and State Department.3 67 On the one
hand, members of Congress were beholden to a constituency that
was voicing its growing antagonism to increased immigration
within the United States.16' The very large number of Indochinese
admitted in the country since 1975 crystallized their ill will against
immigration.369
Not only was there a negative reaction to the Vietnamese
refugees, but Congress and the Carter Administration also wanted
to punish Vietnam for mass expulsion of its own citizens.' Some
commentators have asserted that:
[A] majority in Congress believed that the U.S. should maintain
a policy of economic and political coercion to try to force
Vietnam to change its ways. Since 1977, Congress had
prohibited bilateral aid to Vietnam and expressed strong
opposition to loans by international financial institutions to
Hanoi on the grounds that Hanoi violated human rights and such
aid would not serve U.S. interests or increase stability in
Southeast Asia. Attempts to resume relations with Vietnam
during 1977 and the first half of 1978 had failed principally
364 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 132.
365 Id. at 132.
366 Id.
367 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 34.
368 Id.
369 Id.
370 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 138.
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because of Hanoi's insistence that the U.S. provide
reconstruction aid before the establishment of diplomatic
relations."'
Although foreign policy was a major motivation for the change
in immigration policy, it was not the sole motivation. The salience
of race and xenophobia was very apparent during the refugee
crisis. In the late 1970s, politicians in Congress seized upon the
refugee crisis and the feelings that it aroused, and magnified an
already acute apprehension, if not fear of the seemingly endless
flow of Asians into the country. 1 2 The crisis was defined in ways
that invited readily ascertainable policy solutions to create political
opportunities.
1. House Subcommittee Hearings
There was a series of hearings in 1977 continuing through
1978 before the House Subcommittee on Immigration,
Citizenship, and International Law on the admission of refugees
into the United States.173 Two bills (H.R. 3056 and H.R. 7175)
were considered to review the procedures for the admission of
refugees. 7' As the hearings were taking place, the Indochinese
crisis continued to escalate.375 According to scholars Deborah
Anker and Michael Posner:
The Carter Administration, not considering itself bound by
President Ford's moratorium, initiated yet another parole
program in 1977. Informal consultation with Congress on this
program, involving 15,000 Vietnamese boat and land refugees,
occurred during these 1977 congressional hearings on refugees.
The Subcommittee disapproved of the confused procedures
involved in the request, the lack of selection criteria, and the
abandonment of those criteria formulated in the 1976 program.376
371 Id.
372 Johnson, supra note 90, at 174.
373 Hearings on H.R. 3056 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and
Int'l Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess (1977) [hereinafter
Hearings on H.R. 3056].
374 H.R. 3056, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 3414 (1977); H.R. 7175, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 14648 (1977).
375 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 31.
376 Id. at 31-32.
[Vol. 26
THE REFUGEE BURDEN
In reaction to Chairman Eilberg's continual pressuring for
more formal consultation procedures, the Carter Administration
argued that the existing informal requirement of Congressional
consultation worked as an impediment to any effective response to
the present emergency.377 Throughout the Senate debates, a few
State Department officials decided to solicit the assistance of
outside advocacy groups to overcome the inevitable political
impediments within the Administration and to mobilize public
opinion."' As Gill Loescher and John Scanlan explain:
The subsequent formation of a special commission for
Indochinese refugees, whose membership includes a number of
representatives of humanitarian and public and private agencies
and individuals who spawned the gap between governmental
and privates interests was part of a long tradition of close
collaboration between the voluntary agencies and the State
Department on U.S refugee policy. Working together to
influence admission policy, both played a major role on
subsequent decisions made by the Carter administration to admit
thousands of Indochinese.379
In rebuttal, Congress strongly questioned the nature and
sincerity of the Administration's efforts. 8 The members of the
subcommittee believed that the Administration was not working
hard enough on their part.81 The subcommittee members even
went so far as to complain that they received no research materials
during the consultations on emergency parole requests "so that
about all that the Administration was accomplishing at various
points in these various programs was conveying their [own] sense
of emergency but certainly [possessing] no sense of refugee
policies."38
The tension between Congress and the Carter Administration
continued seemingly without end. 83 As Chairman Eilberg
377 Hearings on S. 643 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 36 (1979).
378 LOESCHER& SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 129.
379 Id.
380 Hearings on H.R. 3056, supra note 373, at 9.
381 Id.
382 Id.
383 See Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 32-33.
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continually criticized the Administration for an incoherent refugee
policy, the subcommittee members came to view the Attorney
General as being both a sword and a shield for White House
requests.384
"Congress, in response to the severe limitations and
consequences of the existing ad hoc policy, considered [two
proposed] bills [(H.R. 3056 and H.R. 7175)] during the 1977-78
hearings.""38 While these two bills contained standard language
from previously debated legislation, such as a ban against firmly
resettled refugees, and a definition of a "normal flow" category of
20,000 annually, it also included some major changes which
signified the existing conflict between the Executive and the
Congress over two major issues: (1) specific numerical limits in
response to the very large number of Indochinese admitted into the
country since 1975; and (2) control over refugee decision-
making.
386
Significantly, Congress attempted to move away from the
flexibility inherent in earlier bills by placing, for the first time,
numerical and categorical limitations on emergency admission
while retaining more power and access to information. 87 In
essence, Congress perceived parole authority as a vehicle for
misuse in emergency admissions. Given the past Executive abuse
of it, the parole authority was amended to prohibit the parole of
refugees. 8 The committees' leaders were finally able to mobilize
enough support for a new refugee admissions system.389 According
to Peter Schuck, "[tihey envisioned a process that would be more
predictable, manageable, and consultive, that would enhance
Congress's policy influence, and that would limit the
administration's parole power. ' 39" The bill established two
emergency refugee categories that were to be the executive basis
for triggering the President's authority to initiate a refugee
384 Hearings on S. 645 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 36 (1979).
385 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 33.
386 Id. at 33-34.
387 Id. at 34.
388 H.R. 3056, supra note 374, § 212(d)(5).
389 See Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 34.
390 Id.
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admission program."'
First, Congress required emergency refugee program decisions
to be made in consultation with the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees upon a determination that the emergency admissions
would significantly promote the national interest.39 2 Second, a
determination had to be made that the decision was justified by
grave humanitarian concerns and that regular admission provisions
were inadequate. 93 These two important requirements allowed
Congress to retain more authority than in the past.
394
During this time of intense negotiation and deliberation,
continuing worries still existed in Congress and in individual
states about the long-term costs of recent Indochinese migrants,
which outweighed any "humanitarian concern" leading to
"compassion fatigue, '3 9 a term that came to be associated with the
Indochina refugee issue.396
Despite the fact that the international community was
overwhelmed by the human tragedy initially, the interest in the
plight of the Indochinese eventually dissipated, as a result of the
growing familiarity with the problem, frustration over its
resolution, and the attraction of events elsewhere. 7 "One refugee
official speculated that incidents like the Indochina migration have
a public attention span of about eighteen months. After more than
391 H.R. 3056, supra note 374, § 207(b). According to Anker and Posner:
The emergency refugee categories in H.R. 3056 were intended to be modeled on
the town principle types of past parole programs: a refugee emergency
determined by the President to be of special concern to the United States would
authorize the President to admit 20,000 refugees; an appeal from an
international refugee organization would enable the President to admit fifteen
percent of the total involved, or 5,000 refugees, whichever is less. The President
was required to solicit the cooperation of the international community in
resettling refugees and, in the later event, to make a determination that other
countries in the international community would accept their fair share of
resettlement.
Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 34.
392 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 35.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 198.
396 SUTTER, supra note 210, at 213.
397 Id.
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ten years, some [were] asking how much longer the American
responsibility to the Indochinese [was] to last.""39 A New York
Times article reported that a State Department official "believed
the United States [had] paid its moral debt for its involvement on
the losing side in Indochina." '399
Yet, according to opinion polls, the American public was
never enamored with the idea of resettling large numbers of
Indochinese refugees."° In 1980, "only 19 percent of the
population sampled supported President Carter's plan to admit
168,000 refugees for that year,""0 ' while 46 percent sought
admission reductions.4 12 "Michael Teitelbaum noted that there is no
economic justification for admitting large numbers of unskilled
and ill-educated immigrant workers and their dependents."0 3
In response to the refugee fervor, there were additional efforts
to further tighten the Refugee Act and, in turn, limit Indochinese
admissions. "Heeding the call for fresh approaches to the
Indochina refugee issue, a special Indochinese Refugee Panel was
appointed by Secretary [of State George P.] Schultz in September
of 1985."" 0 Former Iowa Governor Robert D. Ray headed the
panel.4 5 "The panel's recommendation reflected the desire both to
reform the American resettlement program and to tighten up the
application of the Refugee Act of 1980.1406
In the meantime, Representative Joshua Eilberg urged
numerical and categorical limits on refugee admissions."7 He also
criticized what he deemed the Executive Branch's failure to
evaluate the special and economic impact on immigration and
refugee policy and what he perceived to be the Executive's
inability to contemplate the sheer impact of increased refugee
398 Id.
399 Id. at 185.
400 Id. at 179.
401 Id.
402 Id.
403 Id.
404 Id. at 177.
405 Id.
406 Id.
407 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 153.
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admissions.40 8 In response, the Departments of State and Justice
argued that the numerical and categorical limits advocated by
Congressman Eilberg were too rigid in the context of international
refugee crises that instead necessitated flexibility.4" Nevertheless,
in the face of strong congressional support for the proposed
numerical limits, the Department of State eventually
compromised, for the first time, by advocating a statutory
consultation requirement. '
2. Vietnamese Refugees are of "Special Concern"
Because of modern sensibilities about race in the United
States, it is not surprising that the race of immigrants tends to be
suppressed as an outwardly expressed reason for restricting
immigration.' Professor Kevin Johnson noted that "[u]nlike past
anti-immigrant eras, most consider it impermissible to expressly
rely on race as a reason for restricting immigration." '12 He also
observed that "[t]he escalation of the war in Vietnam ...was
accompanied by a growth of racism directed at the Vietnamese
people, which lingers to this day."" 3 With these notions in mind,
Congress, in limiting the number of Indochinese refugees entering
the United States after the end of the Vietnam War, accomplished
indirectly what it could not have done directly.
Perhaps these politicians were trying to avoid the use of
making racial references because of a fear that they might appear
to be racists. Although there was also congressional testimony
about refugees from countries in Eastern Europe, Africa, the
408 H.R. 7175, supra note 374, § 5.
409 Admission of Refugees into the United States: Hearing on H.R. 3056 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and Int'l Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong. 124-25 (1977) (testimony of William Males, HIAS). "The
Executive's position on numerical limits, however, was not always clear or internally
consistent." Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 36.
410 Hearings on H.R. 3056, supra note 373, at 68 (testimony of Hon. John W.
DeWitt, Deputy Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs).
411 See Johnson, supra note 90, at 174.
412 Id. at 175.
41 Id. at 174; see also Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers et al. v.
Dep't of State, 104 F.3d 1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding Vietnamese citizens brought
suit charging that the U.S. government discriminates against them based on nationality in
processing visa applications).
2001]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Middle East, and Latin America,' there was more debate over the
issue of Indochinese refugees.4"5 Throughout the hearings, the
general term "refugees" was conspicuously referred to more often
than the terms "Vietnamese" or "Indochinese."4 '6 Furthermore, the
emergency admission of Indochinese refugees was considered to
be of "special concern" to the United States.4"7
During this time frame, Congress severely dissipated grass-
roots enthusiasm for generous Indochinese refugee admissions,
and, consequently, many of the forces influencing immigration
policy demanded a sharp reduction in Indochinese admission
levels in the United States." 8 Almost immediately after the
November 1980 presidential election, there was a tremendous
thrust by anti-Indochinese refugee advocates for a more narrow
and restrictive refugee admission policy."9 Commentators Gill
Loescher and John Scanlan insightfully mention:
Congress, fully aware of those forces, has responded by
pressuring the Reagan administration into reducing the number
of Indochinese permitted to enter the United States by 75
percent since 1980. The reduction, although very substantial,
would have been even greater except for the persistent efforts of
a small group of influential people inside and outside the Reagan
Administration, who have consistently argued that more
generosity to the Indochinese is justified by cold war as well as
humanitarian considerations.420
It was common knowledge amongst members of Congress that
the term "refugees of special concern" was a euphemism for the
Indochinese refugee crisis. Several members of Congress
advocated for statutorily determined standards to control the
exercise of Executive discretion to make important political
decisions regarding refugees.42' Insisting on the need for statutory
controls, Chairman Holtzman noted:
414 See Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 46.
415 Id.
416 Id.
417 Id.
418 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 198.
419 Id. at 199.
420 Id. at 198-99.
421 See Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 48.
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I want you to focus on the special concern provisions. I do not
think that it is sufficient to come here and say that special
concern is a terrible provision because it will provide certain
limitations when in fact by selecting 50,000 people out of
thirteen million refugees you have to apply some kind of
standards and limitations.2
Notably, the Department of State displayed a pattern and
practice of couching the "special concern" terms in and around
humanitarian rhetoric. These continual references to humanitarian
goals were emphasized during the hearings as the underlying basis
for postwar refugee policy. 13 Similarly, Department of Justice
witnesses commented that "humanitarian concerns present in
'emergent' refugee situations should not be made subject to
numerical limitation inflexibly set by statute. 4 ' 4 Legislative
history shows that Congress also desired to change the term to be
applied in determining the allocation of refugee admissions from
"special concern" to "special humanitarian concern. ,4 5 The intent
of congressional committees was to emphasize the plight of the
refugees themselves rather than their national origins or political
affiliations.2 6 More likely, however, the committee's intent was to
limit the total number of Indochinese refugees, instead of any
genuine humanitarian concerns. Many times, human rights
concerns were stressed in House reports and in statements made
by the House Committee on the Judiciary that emphasized
humanitarian considerations, placing the plight of the refugees and
the pattern of human rights violations in the country of origin as
the first factors to be weighed.2 7 Interestingly, in the final
conference report, all use of the term "special concern" was
replaced with "special humanitarian concern.42 8
The negative public opinion of Vietnamese refugees was
reflected and echoed in the opinions held by many members of
422 Id.
423 Id. at 38.
424 Hearings on H.R. 3056, supra note 373, at 82.
425 H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 207(a), 125 CONG. REc. 12367 (1979).
426 H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
427 H.R. REP. No. 508; 8 U.S.C. §§ 13-14 (1980).
428 Id.
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Congress. 2 1 "Sociologist David Riesman observed in discussing
the negative public reaction to Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s,
racist 'attitudes have been generally repressed since World War II
by the almost uniformly antiracist attitude of the enlightened
stratum of our society.""'43 According to Joseph Sureck, INS
District Director in Hong Kong, "[b]enevolence in accepting [so
many Indochinese] refugees 'may have created a permanent'
immigration problem." 3' Sureck found solace amongst other
"restrictionists[,] includ[ing] several members of Congress who
launched a crusade for more restrictive immigration polic[ies],
[and] budget cut[s] in the Office of Management and Budget and
in the Department of Health and Human Services, the Office of
Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, and ... UNHCR.,
32
The negative attitude towards Vietnamese refugees was also
implicit in Ambassador, and former Senator, Dick Clark's
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee criticizing the
current law's treatment of refugee problems. '33 Ambassador Clark
argued that no preference should be given to Southeast Asians
because "[w]hile the plight of the boat people in Southeast Asia
presents today's most dramatic case, it must not blind us to the
hardships of refugees fleeing oppression and persecution in
Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. '
Those who passed the 1980 Refugee Act claimed that they
desired a less biased system.43 They desired a law that was not
designed largely to benefit fugitives from communism or to
provide protection from a country solely because of the
429 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 102-69 (documenting growing public
concern from 1975 to 1980 with the large number of Indochinese refugees resettling in
the United States and general fear of mass migration); see also e-mail from Kevin R.
Johnson, Associate Dean, U.C. Davis School of Law, to Harvey Gee, Staff Attorney,
U.S. District Court, Reno, Nevada (Oct. 4, 2000) (on file with author) (stating that some
members of Congress did not like the large numbers of Vietnamese refugees changing
their communities for a variety of differences including class, culture, and race).
430 Johnson, supra note 90, at 175.
431 LOESCHER& SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 197-98.
432 Id. at 199.
433 Id. at 154-55.
434 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 46.
435 Id.
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administration's political and ideological biases. '36 Ambassador
Clark was critical of the administration's preference for
Indochinese and its decisions to admit refugees based solely on
political ideology. '37 He testified that as a result of the allocations
of refugee numbers to those of "special concern," particular
attention would be paid to "[w]hether we have a special
responsibility because of previous U.S. political involvement with
the refugee or his country of origin." '438 To support his argument,
Clark presented witnesses who recommended that "special need,
and not special political concern, should be the dominant
criterion."" Apparently, the proffered evidence was given enough
weight to carry the day for the amendment.
3. Final Session Hearings in 1978
In the final session of the hearings in April 1978, a consensus
and a more precise model for the Refugee Act emerged. " The
Carter Administration, well aware of the new law's likely effects,
gave its support to legislative efforts but requested ongoing parole
authorization for Indochinese, Eastern European and Soviet
refugees until new refugee legislation was passed by Congress.4 1
On the Senate floor, Senator Edward Kennedy "emphasized the
need for a high-level commission to make a comprehensive review
of our present immigration laws and policies." '42 The review,
Senator Kennedy explained, was "beyond the capacity and scope
of a single agency of the Executive Branch or a committee of
436 Id.
437 Refugee Act of 1979: Hearing on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees, and Int'l Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.
177 (1979) (testimony of Whitney Ellsworth and Hurst Hannum, Amnesty International
U.S.A.).
438 Id. at 44. (testimony' of Dick Clark, Ambassador at Large and United States
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs).
439 Id. at 177 (testimony of Whitney Ellsworth and Hurst Hannum, Amnesty
International U.S.A.). It was asserted that an important factor to be contemplated in
determining "special concern" status was whether "refugees [were] from a country
wherein there exists a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights." Id. at 174.
440 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 41.
441 Hearings on H.R. 2816, supra note 437, at 41.
442 Kennedy, supra note 1, at 2.
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Congress, and.., must involve a broad spectrum of opinion and
groups concerned with immigration reform."4 '3 According to
Anker and Posner, "[as a] major force behind refugee reform,
Senator Kennedy a month earlier had introduced legislation in the
Senate (S. 2751) which paralleled some of the [Carter]
Administration's positions. This legislation provided the
immediate impetus for the [Carter] Administration to come forth
with concrete proposals."'" "[I]n late 1978, Congress approved
legislation [that Kennedy] moved through the Senate (H.R.
12443), 445 establishing the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy.
4 6
On the last day of the hearings, "the [Carter] Administration
proposed that the 'normal flow' refugee admission be set at up to
50,000. ' 4  The Carter Administration "argued that [this] allocation
represented the actual average number of refugees admitted in
recent years and did not involve any numerical increase.
48
"Accommodation of the 50,000 [refugees] within the 'normal
flow' category would avoid recurring reliance on emergency
procedures which would only be utilized in new, unforeseen
emergency conditions. 44' 9  The Carter Administration also
suggested that priority in allocating the "normal flow" numbers be
given to refugees deemed to be of "special concern.""
443 Id. at 3.
The Commission's membership assured the broad and high-level review of the
issue that was needed. Sixteen members were drawn from the following areas:
four members were selected from each of the Judiciary Committees of Congress
(which have jurisdiction over immigration legislation); four cabinet members;
the Secretary of State, the Attorney-General, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, and the Secretary of Labor; and four public members
appointed by the President, including the Chairman, who was Father Theodore
M. Hesburgh, president of the University of Notre Dame.
Id.
444 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 41.
"5 H.R. 12443, 95th Congress, 2d Sess. (1978).
446 Kennedy, supra note 1, at 2.
447 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 42.
41 Id. at 42. "The Administration endorsed and extended the 'special concern'
language and supported a more inclusive interpretation." Id.
449 Id.
450 H.R. 2816, supra note 425, § 201.
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Largely due to Senator Kennedy's pressure on the
Administration, the congressional bills containing the universal
nondiscriminatory definition of refugee and incorporating the
President's suggestion of up to 50,000 annual admissions as the
"normal flow" were adopted.45" ' The "normal flow" numbers were
to be allocated among groups of refugees that the President
considered to be of "special concern. 45 2
The tension between the Administration and Congress
continued. Following further committee and subcommittee
hearings, amendments to the original Administration bill were
incorporated into House and Senate reports. 3 The House
committee bill also sought to make consultation mandatory as to
the locations of refugee admission without regard to any special
deference given to the President's authority concerning groups of
"special concern." '454 As a result, no special deference was given to
refugees coming from any one country. Rather, the bill required
that the President base any designation of "special humanitarian
concern" on a determination after congressional consultation. 5
Despite this narrowing of Presidential power, the House
Committee sought to further limit the Executive's authority to
admit refugees in emergencies by adopting Congressman Eilberg's
proposed restrictions on the use of parole authority of refugee
admissions."' One fascinating point about these arguments is that
they were advanced by legislators who opposed the settlement of
Indochinese refugees. These congressional efforts culminated in
changes made in the annual and emergency admission provisions,
which substantially limited the Executive's parole authority.
4. 1979 House and Senate Debates
The House and Senate Floor debates on December 20, 1979
were revealing.5 7 The record shows that the intense pressure to
451 S. REP. No. 250, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 (1979).
452 H.R. 2816, supra note 425, § 201.
453 S. REP. No. 250, supra note 451, at 3.
454 H.R. 2816, supra note 425, § 207(b), adopted in the Refugee Act at 8 U.S.C. §
1157(b) (1980).
455 Id.
456 H.R. 3056, supra note 374, § 212(d)(5); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1253(d)(5)(B).
457 H.R. 2816, supra note 425.
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involve the international community in the Indochina refugee
situation increased dramatically during the first half of 1979 as the
growing refugee outflow affected more countries."8  The
international response grew gradually from the human tragedy and
the large scale suffering that the media began to depict as an
"Asian holocaust." '59 Senator Robert Dole extended this analogy to
the Holocaust when he remarked, "[w]e are all too familiar with
the painful remembrance of ships loaded with European Jews
seeking refuge during the Nazi period and in the aftermath of
World War II. Many people found death after being herded from
one port to another."4" Despite Senator's Dole's forewarning,
many Southeast Asian governments continually and forcibly
turned away refugees at the frontier on the high seas. '61
Nevertheless, the Carter Administration played a great moral
leadership role in the international effort to provide refuge to the
boat people. " 2 Ultimately, the Carter Administration threw its
weight behind the emerging international sentiment favoring the
rescue drive. "3 This groundswell of sympathy was driven by a fear
of widespread prosecution and mass murder."
However, despite its earnest attempts to save the refugees, the
Carter Administration was unable to move fast enough to keep up
with the flow of refugees and could not obtain adequate funding
for the large admissions program. '65 In response to the situation,
there was great debate centering on congressional control over
refugee admissions numbers and the strengthening of the
consultation process." Discussions of liberating limits were met
with great opposition. '67 Members were fearful of an expansive
458 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 140.
419 Id. Public attention was also focused on the crisis as evidenced by public
comments heard in Washington and New York in support of the boat people and in Time
Magazine's lead articles, entitled, Save Us! Save Us!, appealing to people's humanitarian
consciences. Id. at 143.
460 Id. at 141.
461 Id.
462 Id.
463 Id.
464 Id.
465 Id.
466 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 56.
467 Id.
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admission policy untempered by numerical limits or by clear
congressional controls. '68
The dual themes of Congress regaining authority over refugee
admissions and excluding the immense numbers of Vietnamese
refugees coming to the United States were repeated in the House
floor debates. In a separate statement, Congressman Fascell
expressed the perennial fears of opening the "numerical"
floodgates to a surge of refugees into the United States. 469 He
proposed an amendment that required refugee status to be
specially designated by the President, only after consultation with
Congress.47°
Subsequently, a second amendment was proffered by
Congressman Butler that called for an addition of a "sunset
clause" to the admission provision.4"1 Under the "sunset clause,"
the "normal flow" refugee admission after 1982 would be returned
to 17,400, in addition to the number of refugees admitted under
the provisions of Section 203(1)(7) of the INA.7 2 Congressman
Sessenbrenner supported the amendment with his comment that
sun-setting the increased flow of refugees at the end of fiscal year
1982, "will give Congress an opportunity to review the report of
that commission and its recommendations and hopefully enact a
permanent policy relating to both refugees and nonrefugee
immigrants. 473  Congresswoman Holtzman accepted this
amendment that was later adopted.474
During the final house debates on the Conference Bill,
Congresswoman Chiselhold further espoused her hopes that in the
future there should not be any ethnic or racial biases in refugee
decisions. Congressman Rodino also conveyed his strong
support for the bill and exclaimed that it was:
One of the most important pieces of humanitarian legislation
ever enacted by a United States Congress .... [It] confirm[ed]
468 Id.
469. H.R. 2816, supra note 425.
470 125 CONG. REc. H12369 (1979).
471 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1963), plead by 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(c)(7) (1986).
472 Id..
413 125 CONG. REc. H12370 (1979).
474 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 58.
475 126 CONG. REc. 1522 (1980).
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what this Government and .the American people are all about.
... By their deep decision and untiring efforts, the United States
once again . . . demonstrated its concern for the homeless, the
defenseless, and the persecuted people who fall victim to
tyrannical and oppressive government regimes.476
Congressman Hyde made another amendment "designed to
strengthen the consultation mechanism. 477 Hyde's amendment
provided for a hearing to be held to review any proposal to
increase refugee admission. Under the amendment, such a
hearing would be required to apply in situations where the "normal
flow" was to go above the 50,000 "normal flow" limit.79 "The
amendment was adopted unopposed by Congresswoman
Holtzman. ' Furthermore, Congressman Moorehead offered the
most controversial amendment, which provided that a presidential
determination to increase the number of refugees admitted above
the "normal flow" would not go into effect if at the end of fifteen
days of continuous session either house passed a resolution
disapproving the determination.' It was no surprise that this
particular amendment was designed to apply only to a foreseeable
influx of refugees.482 Though opposed by Congresswoman
Holtzman, this additional amendment was also passed and
adopted. In the end, the House passed the Refugee Act of 1980 in
a close 192-107 vote. 3
At the time the Act was passed, President Carter faced a
terrible economy replete with inflation and recession,
accompanied by rising unemployment. Automobile manufacturers
laid off one quarter of a million workers. 84 Downward trends
developed in the steel, tires, and housing construction industries. 85
Faced with the 1980 recession, Carter agonized over decisions,
476 Id.
477 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 58.
478 Id.
479 Id.; see also 125 CONG. REc. H12370 (1979).
480 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 58.
481 Id.
482 H.R. 3056, supra note 374, § 212(d)(5).
483 126 CONG. REc. 1522 (1980).
484 KOENIG, supra note 209, at 262.
485 Id.
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resolving to check expanding unemployment without aggravating
inflation."6 The business community was fearful that Carter would
shun tax cuts and that the inflation fight might be abandoned early,
causing chaotic consequences for interest rates and the bond and
stock markets."' At the same time, Congress, during an election
year, successfully pressured the administration to subsidize
additional housing construction and to cut mortgage interest
costs.4"'
5. Substance and Procedure: The Refugee Act of 1980 as
New Law
Peter Schuck states that the significance of this decade for
immigration politics may be grasped by comparing the prospects
for reform.8 In 1980, the Carter Administration was in its "final
death throes, struggling with the political legacy of two straight
years of double-digit inflation, high unemployment (soon to go
higher), and a deliberating hostage crisis in Iran." ' ° These events
were cause for concern for cautious politicians and their respective
constituents.91
In addition, illegal immigration across the Southern border
added to this period of tremendous demographic change.9 2 This
period of great influx of immigrants to the United States witnessed
significant increases in animus towards immigrants. 3 Indeed, the
sheer volume of these illegal crossings caused environmental and
population control organizations to form the Federation for
American Immigration Reform (FAIR), an anti-immigration
lobbying group, in a collaborative effort to implement restrictive
immigration legislation." Schuck observes that Senator Alan
Simpson of Wyoming, a politician who would exercise the most
influence over the shape of the new legislation during the 1980s,
486 Id.
487 Id. at 263.
488 Id.
489 SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 97.
490 Id.
491 Id.
492 Id.
493 Id.
494 Id.
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began the decade by proclaiming his strong restrictionist
leanings.'
"In the negative sense, some civil rights groups, who spurned
rhetoric that echoed FAIR, also shared concerns about minority
job losses." '96 In 1979, "Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman
Edward Kennedy, concerned that growing illegal migration could
trigger a political backlash against immigration, persuaded
Congress to establish a Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy (SCIRP) to propose new, hopefully prudent
solutions."4 '7 Schuck asserts that, with the exception of the
Immigration Act of 1965, Congress had paid little attention to
immigration policy."8  However, when "[tihe Reagan
administration assumed office in 1981 and the Republicans also
gained control of the Senate, these stirrings seemed especially
auspicious for reform." '99
The year 1980 brought an abrupt change to American
immigration law. The Refugee Act allowed two tracks for refugee
admission into the United States: (1) a provision giving the
President the power to admit refugees into the United States only
after consultation with Congress; and (2) procedures for aliens in
the United States or at ports of entry to apply for asylum."t The
United States has admitted more than one million refugees under
the first track since 1980, although the numbers have seen more
regulation than under the previous parole authority. 0' "The
additional annual admission category was created to accommodate
crises such as the mass exodus of the 'boat people' from Southeast
Asia. 50 2 This category was also created for emergency admission
of groups of "special concern" to the United States.0 3 Also, the
reforms restrict the Attorney General's authority to parole
refugees, which prevents any large, ex parte admissions, such as
495 Id.
496 Id.
497 Id.
498 Id.
499 Id.
50 ING, supra note 93, at 28.
501 Id.
502 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 44.
503 Id.
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the pre-1980 admission of Indochinese refugees."°
Significantly, under the language of the Refugee Act, any
future bills limiting the admission of Indochinese refugees will
face fewer opportunities for contest. For example:
Prior consultation was required to consider only the number of
refugees admitted under the additional admissions and
emergency admission clauses. No consultation was required to
review the conferral of "special concern" status upon particular
groups of refugees or the allocation of numbers among them.
The consultation process itself was not described in detail and
the bill did not contain a provision for a congressional veto."'
Despite the view by some that the Refugee Act is an
instrument for humanitarian ends, the Act's actual administration
has not prevented egregious abuse by the Executive Branch as
expected. In practice, the Refugee Act of 1980 has been
administered in a manner that is reminiscent of the arbitrary use of
the seventh preference and parole provisions. 6 Bill Ong Hing
observes:
Without much congressional opposition, presidents have
continued to favor refugees from Communist countries while
consistently ignoring pleas of those from U.S. allies. The
number of Asian refugees has declined accordingly.
The executive branch and Congress established a limit of
234,000 refugees for fiscal [year] 1980. The Carter
administration then reserved 169,000 places for Southeast Asia,
33,000 for the former Soviet Union, 19,500 for Cuba, and 1,000
for the remainder of Latin America. By 1985 the total number of
refugee admittees dropped to 70,000 with 50,000 reserved for
East Asia. . . .The number for East Asia remains at 52,000,
despite dire circumstances in Asian refugee camps.5°7
Further, Hing believes that "the decency evidenced in such
legislation cannot conceal the ideological bias that has permeated
504 HING, supra note 152, at 127. Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980, the definition
and admission of refugees was based on ideology and geography. GOODWIN-GILL, supra
note 159, at 22.
105 Anker & Posner, supra note 83, at 44.
506 HING, supra note 152, at 127.
507 Id.
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refugee practices,""5 8 and "the impulse to conceal and deny actual
motivations has been followed. Expressly bluffing the boundaries
between immigration and refugee policies helps to avert the need
for self-deprecation." 9
The 1980 Refugee Act, which established new controls on
refugee admissions, actually caused the decline, if not permanent
stoppage, of the flow of refugees entering the United States
despite persistent humanitarian pressure on the United States.
Needless to say, as a result of the Refugee Act of 1980 and the
adoption of subsequent recommendations made by the Selection
Commission, the admission of Vietnamese refugees has
experienced a gradual downward trend.
Bill Ong Hing notes that "[a]lthough the 1980 Refugee Act
established new controls, the flow of refugees continues due to
persistent humanitarian pressure on the United States. After a
second, sizable wave entered in 1980, the flow of new entries
declined steadily."51 This drop began as early as September 21,
1981, when President Reagan recommended that Congress
approve a 1982 ceiling of 173,000 refugee slots and reserve
119,800 of those slots for Indochinese."' There were
recommendations for lower levels of immigration by members of
the House of Representatives because of their concerns about the
domestic impact of large refugee flows into the United States. '12
For example, three members of the House Judiciary Committee
were "consulted" by President Reagan, and they subsequently
recommended that the overall allocation be reduced to 140,000."'
Likewise, Representative Mazzoli recommended that the overall
ceiling be limited to 120,000, with a maximum of 84,000 slots
reserved for Indochinese." 4
House members Malloy, Fish, and Rodino made further
appeals for more restrictions directly to President Reagan.5 In a
508 Id. at 128.
509 Id.
510 Id. at 134.
511 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 201.
512 Id.
513 Id.
514 Id.
515 Id.
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collaborative effort, the three representatives drafted a letter,
which, in effect, utilized language about financial concerns as a
proxy for their true concerns about Indochinese."6 The three wrote:
We are concerned by your decision to maintain a high level of
refugee admissions, because it is not accompanied by a request
for adequate funding to meet their resettlement needs. At a time
when we are sharply cutting social programs urgently needed by
the disadvantaged and the needy members of our society, it
becomes more difficult to justify an annual Federal expenditure
in excess of one billion dollars for refugees. Further, this
growing competition for Federal resources will undoubtedly
produce increasing resentment toward refugees in general." 7
These structured efforts to reduce the Indochinese flow were
effective. Bill Hing summarizes that "[i]n 1984, 40,604
Vietnamese refugees entered, then the average dropped to about
22,000 until 1988 when 17,626 were admitted. So by 1988,
540,700 Vietnamese refugees had arrived. By October 1991,
18,280 AmerAsians (mostly from Vietnam) arrived along with
another 44,071 relatives. 51 8
6. Further Limitations Imposed: When "Less" means
"Less"
During the Reagan Administration, and after the passage of the
Act, severe unemployment reached a high not seen since the Great
Depression of the 1930s." 9 Reagan opposed any sizable public job
programs to relieve unemployment, discounting such programs as
"make-work and dead-end" jobs. 2 As an alternative, Reagan
"prescribed the bitter medicine of cutting government spending as
the route to economic recovery and growth. 52'
516 See id.
517 Id. Writing alone to President Reagan, Representative Mazzoli endorsed the
views of his colleagues, emphasizing the impact of refugees on state and local
governments. Id.
"' HING, supra note 152, at 134.
519 KOENIG, supra note 209, at 263; see also Carolyn Lochead, Bush and Gore Miles
Apart On What Made Economy Roar, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 2000, at Al (characterizing
the national economy during Reagan's first term, as the "worst recession since the Great
Depression").
520 KOENIG, supra note 209, at 263.
521 Id.
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Coinciding with the employment of more restrictive
immigration policies, the Reagan Administration's fiscal policies
created obstacles to the needs of these communities due to their
emphasis on smaller federal programs and reduced spending for
social services, job training, housing, education, and public
welfare.522 Congress followed suit by imposing a host of new
restrictions on federal reimbursement to the States for refugee
resettlement.123 Peter Schuck states that:
In August 1982, Senator Walter (Dee) Huddleston of Kentucky,
FAIR's chief advocate in the Senate for tighter limits on legal
immigration, mobilized considerable support for a decidedly
restrictive bill. It would have capped all legal immigration
(including refugees and "immediate relatives," neither of which
categories was capped at that time) at 425,000, a level far below
the almost 600,000 immigrants and refugees admitted that
.524year.
At the same time, representatives of organized labor doubled
their traditional efforts to preserve American jobs for American
workers as the nation experienced an economic downturn.
2
Finally, in fiscal year 1986, President Reagan trimmed 7,000
slots from his proposed refugee allocation after Senators Strom
Thurmond and Alan Simpson and Representatives Rodino and
Ramono Marzolli recommended that Indochinese numbers be
reduced by at least 12,000.26 Eventually, the American
resettlement program fell victim to efforts to reduce the budget
deficit. 27 For fiscal year 1986, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
legislation resulted in the overall reduction of refugee admissions
522 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 203. Cf Johnson, supra note 143, at
1510 (commenting on the general public's lack of sympathy and frequent antipathy for
welfare recipients).
523 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 203; see also Kennedy, supra note 1,
at 3-4 (considering the prevailing anti-immigration climate within Congress in 1981).
524 SCHUCK, supra note 2, at 98.
525 Id. But see HING, supra note 93, at 156-59 (explaining that such an outlook
dismisses the positive impact of a diversified American society on the economy and
noting that immigrants and refugees often represent the most ambitious individuals from
their countries of origin and thus are assets to the American culture).
526 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 218, at 207-08.
527 SUTrER, supra note 210, at 181.
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to the United States from an expected 67,000 to 61,000 refugees. 8
For the Indochinese refugees, the revised level of admission
dropped from 45,500 to 43,500.529 The Office of Refugee
Resettlement's budget was cut by 4.3 percent.530
The vestiges of racism surrounding the passage of the Refugee
Act of 1980 persist to this day. The inability of Vietnamese
refugees to support themselves and other related experiences have
served as cannon fodder for immigration restrictionists.53' Indeed,
the efforts to close the borders and allow no one to come to this
country have continued without end.532 Many have espoused anti-
immigrant feelings. For instance, John Miller is concerned that the
failure of immigrants to assimilate into this country's majority
culture will result in a permanent underclass with a high welfare
dependence.533 Miller observes the profound effect of mass
immigration on the culture and racial composition of the United
528 Id.
529 Id.
530 Id.
53, See MILLER, supra note 63, at 139 (stating that "Southeast Asians, however, are
overwhelmingly first-generation Americans who arrived as poor, displaced refugees.");
see also Larry Hajime Shinagawa, The Impact of Immigration on the Demography of
Asian Pacific Americans, in REFRAMING THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE supra note 258, at 81
(stating that "[a]mong Asian Pacific American ethnic groups, the top five groups to use
public assistance were Hmong Americans (64.7 percent), Laotian Americans (57.3
percent), Cambodian Americans (52.5 percent), Vietnamese Americans (50.7 percent),
and Korean Americans (39.3 percent).").
532 See generally Delgado, supra note 22, at 319.
533 See MILLER, supra note 63, at 5-11,215-17; see also Ong & Blumenberg, supra
note 223, at 121 (claiming that "[ulnlike other ethnic or racial groups, Southeast Asians
have been channeled into welfare programs as a part of a national strategy to facilitate
their economic assimilation").
The direct incorporation of Southeast Asians into the welfare system has created
a unique population on public assistance. The most salient difference among
ethnic and racial groups on welfare is household structure. Close to 90 percent
of Southeast Asian [welfare] households contain two parents, a sharp
divergence from the customary image of the single welfare mother. In contrast
only 43 percent of non-Hispanic white, 21 percent of black, and 40 percent of
Laotian households contain two parents. Southeast Asian households also have
higher fertility rates.... [T]he average family size for Southeast Asian
households is close to five persons, while the average family size for other
welfare households is approximately 3.5 persons.
Id. at 123.
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States, which he believes is caused by immigration itself. '34 Part of
this failure to assimilate, Miller says, is attributed to the fact that
unlike past generations, immigrants today tend to maintain their
identity more strongly than the immigrants of the past.535 For
Miller, this threatens the cohesiveness of the United States by
discouraging present-day immigrants from assimilating.536
To restrictionist Peter Brimelow, author of the best-selling
polemic, AlienNation: Common Sense About America's
Immigration Disaster,537 the Refugee Act of 1980 was a
comprehensive refugee policy that was "promptly captured and
debauched by special interests groups." '538 In particular, Brimelow
criticizes the continual admission of Vietnamese to the United
States. He fervently declares:
[Even] twenty years after Saigon fell, the United States is still
admitting Vietnamese claiming to be children of American
servicemen. In 1992 alone, a total of 17,253 arrived under the
AmerAsian Homecoming Act. Only 4,261 were the alleged
children themselves-the rest were their immediate relatives,
typical of the way 'family reunification' tends to take over all
categories. But of those 4,261, over a third (37 percent) were
born more than nine months after the last U.S. troops left
Vietnam. They were obvious frauds ... but the U.S. government
admitted them anyway. 39
Furthermore, similar anti-Asian attitudes have also recently
114 MILLER, supra note 63, at 6-11.
535 Id.
536 Id.; see also PETER D. SALINS, ASSIMILATION, AMERICAN STYLE 85-89 (1997)
(acknowledging that the assimilationist norm is specifically white Anglo-Saxon
Protestant). But see The "Varied Carols" of America: A Democratic History, in A
LARGER MEMORY: A HISTORY OF OUR DIVERSITY, WITH VOICES 5 (Ronald Takaki ed.,
1998) (dispelling the "widely held but inaccurate view that 'American' means white or
European in ancestry").
Americanization must be refrained, as the commission has, as a reciprocal and
mutual process of accommodation, rather than a one-way street process of
assimilation by immigrants. Immigrants, aspiring Americans, have a
relationship with current American citizens and with the country they wish to
join. This relationship implies a mutuality of responsibility and obligation.
Pera, supra note 51, at 65.
537 BRIMELOW, supra note 64.
538 Id. at 246.
539 Id. at 247.
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moved beyond immigration issues into the political and
democratic process concerning civil rights and liberties. This was
most evident in the portrayal of the myth of Asian Americans as
"the model minority" in the debates over affirmative action,5 40 the
John Huang/Democratic National Committee fund raising
controversy,54' the Republican Senate's efforts to block the
confirmation of Bill Lann Lee as Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights,5 4' and the prosecution of former Los Alamos nuclear
scientist Wen Ho Lee for allegedly providing nuclear secrets to the
Chinese government. 43 In addition, the 105th Congress introduced
540 See, e.g., Margaret Chon, The Truth About Asian Americans, in THE BELL CURVE
DEBATE: HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, OPINIONS 238 (Russell Jacoby & Naomi Glauberman
eds., 1995) (addressing the stereotype of Asians as being super-intelligent and the
misuses of the model minority myth); Frank H. Wu, From Black to White and Back
Again, 3 ASIAN L.J. 185, 208-10 (1996) (book review) (discussing the portrayal of Asian
Americans as a "model minority" and deploying this stereotype to attack affirmative
action); Theodore K. Cheng, Clarifying Some Misconceptions About Affirmative Action
in Higher Education for Asian Americans, 1 U.S.F. J.L. & SoC. CHALLENGES 129, 133-
35 (1997) (analyzing and situating Asian Americans in the affirmative action debate).
541 See generally Frank H. Wu & May L. Nicholson, Have You No Decency? Racial
Aspects of Media Coverage on the John Huang Matter, 7 ASIAN AM. POL'Y REV. 1
(1997) (analyzing the campaign fundraising efforts of Democratic Party official John
Huang). Frank Wu also suggests that at the time of the campaign financing scandal,
Asian Americans were facing real racial stereotyping as they attempted to participate in
the electoral process. Asian American donors were closely scrutinized by the Democratic
National Committee, and "[t]he questions aimed at Asian-Americans reflect the same
stereotyping that has portrayed all Asian-derived people as foreigners, even if they are
fifth-generation Californians." Frank H. Wu, Asian Americans Under Glass, THE
NATION, Mar. 31, 1997, at 15-16. The media coverage also exacerbated the racial
stereotyping hysteria.
The major media outlets didn't even bother to ask about the racial angle to the
audit, perhaps they have helped generate the frenzy over foreign influence-
thus neglecting the real issue of campaign influence reform. Phrases like The
American Spectator's 'Bamboo Network' or William Safire's favorite, 'The
Asian Connection,' perpetuate the stereotyping that formerly brought us the
'Yellow Peril' and the 'Asiatic Hordes.' As Congress irons out committee
funding and structure to carry out its own investigations of the money
connections on the presidential election, it is imperative that the focus remain
on influence-buying as an issue without assuming that this is a problem to
which people of Asian descent are almost genetically predisposed.
Id.
542 Frank H. Wu, Bill Lann Lee is the Best Choice, ASIAN WEEK, Apr. 8, 1999, at 10
(questioning attacks on Bill Lann Lee as being more about his race and personal views
on affirmative action rather than his qualifications).
543 See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization, Racial Profiling and the
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over one hundred bills affecting immigration." These examples
underscore the fact that issues of race and ethnicity are just as
salient today as they were during the Chinese exclusion period in
the United States.
VH. Conclusion
"The Refugee Act that President Carter signed on March 17,
1980 had little to say about asylum; to the drafters of the Act, it
was essentially an afterthought.""5 '
To this day, the Refugee Act of 1980 is still widely
misunderstood. Most academic commentators, including Peter
Schuck, have focused on the fact that special humanitarian
restrictions on Vietnamese immigration undermined the avowed
foreign policy purposes of the Refugee Act. Others suggest that
reference to the Vietnam War in and of itself is insufficient to
explain the structure of the law. The reality, however, is that the
Refugee Act provided strict controls on the admission of
Vietnamese.
Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1689, 1689-93 (2000) (using the case of Wen
Ho Lee, the Chinese American nuclear physicist accused of espionage, as an example of
the racial treatment of Asian Americans as different from African Americans); Frank H.
Wu, Racial Stereotyping in Spy Case?, THE RECORD, Dec. 19, 1999, at 7 (addressing the
racial aspects of the Wen Ho Lee espionage controversy); Theodore Hsien Wang &
Frank H. Wu, Wen Ho Lee Was Singled Out By Race, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 1, 2000,
at 1 IB; see also David E. Rovella, How Wen Ho Lee's Lawyers Beat Back the DOJ's
Case, THE RECORDER, Oct. 4, 2000, at 3; Charles Woo, Dream Sours: The Incarceration
of Wen Ho Lee Was a Denial of Due Process, S.F. DAILY J., Oct. 11, 2000, at 4.
Even more disturbing are charges that the government routinely singled out
Asian Americans, including Lee, in espionage investigations. The former chief
counterintelligence officer at Los Alamos state[d] that "ethnic Chinese"
laboratory employees were singled out in a joint FBI and Department of
Energy investigation aimed at identifying possible spies for China.... Every
"ethnic" Chinese is perceived as an espionage threat, but this racialization
could justify racial profiling against any number of ethnic groups in the future.
The government has also failed to provide any proof that Chinese Americans
are more likely to spy for China. When pressed, counterintelligence officials
cannot cite any studies, statistics or examples, leaving the impression that their
practice may be based on a racial stereotype.
Id.
5" Immigration & Immigrant-Related Legislation in the 105th Congress, at
http://www.ncsl.orgstatefed/FEDSUM.HTM (last visited Nov. 20, 2000).
545 Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation ofImmigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
40(1984).
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The fact that the Act was passed to terminate the continual ad
hoc admissions of Indochinese refugees underlies the rhetoric of
those who regard the Act as a great law passed in the spirit of
humanitarianism and those who view its implementation as largely
preventing the practice of political favoritism allowed by pre-1980
refugee laws. The legislative history demonstrates that the Act was
neither entirely humanitarian nor egalitarian. Indeed, Congress
passed it even though the Act would create a comprehensive
ceiling on the number of Indochinese refugees permitted to enter
the United States.

